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LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS  
TO CONFRONT CHILD SOLDIERING1 
 





Child soldiers in theatres of armed conflict represent the worst and most abusive forms of child labour.  
States parties to the conflict, as well as third party States, bear differentiated and continuing international legal 
obligations in relation to child soldiering. Not only are States parties to the conflict barred under international 
humanitarian law from drafting this class of protected persons into child soldiering, but it may also be argued that 
other States in the multilateral economic system can independently take measures pursuant to the General 
Exceptions (Article XX) and Security Exceptions (Article XXI) clauses of the GATT 1994 to ensure, prevent, and 
deter parties from enjoying economic advantages illicitly obtained from the labour of child soldiers.  As the 
International Labour Organization has advocated in ILO Convention No. 182, States also have a significant role in 
post-conflict situations to guarantee effective and meaningful international human rights protection in the 
demobilization of child soldiers and their reintegration to their respective home communities and regional societies.  
Where child soldiers have been used en masse to perpetuate trade in both facially-licit and contraband goods, States 
can design policy measures that facially depart from the multilateral trading rules against non-discrimination, most 
favoured nation, market access, and unfair trade, but without incurring international legal sanction. 
 
 
“We must not rest, until all children who have been recruited or 
used in violation of international law have been released, and until 
all children feel safe in their homes, schools and communities, 
without fear that they will be forced into war.” 




Children are the greatest casualties of war.  Domestic and international laws have long 
singled out children as a specially protected group of persons, recognizing that children lack the 
autonomy afforded by an adult’s developed capacity for self-protection, decision-making, 
responsibility, and accountability. John Stuart Mill’s theory of liberal utilitarianism famously 
acknowledges this in On Liberty, when, as an exception, he proposes special treatment for 
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children, “who must be protected against their own actions as well as external injury.”4  This 
premise resonates most significantly in the laws of war, where children enjoy dual protections, 
first, as civilians,5 and second, as a special class of protected persons.6 
The forcible conscription of children to serve as child soldiers in armed conflicts violates 
every norm of protection in international human rights and humanitarian law.7  While the 1949 
Geneva Conventions do not contain specific norms dealing with the phenomenon of children as 
combatants, Article 77 of Protocol I explicitly requires parties to an international armed conflict 
to “take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years 
do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them 
into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen 
years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.” Article 4(3)(c) of Protocol II, on the other 
hand, similarly binds parties to a non-international armed conflict to observe that “children who 
have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups 
nor allowed to take part in hostilities.”  Children who are between the ages of fifteen and 
eighteen years and who take part in the hostilities possess the status of combatants.  As 
combatants, these children are entitled upon capture to GC III privileges of prisoners of war, 
with some more favourably differentiated treatment on account of their age.8  Neither can child 
combatants be subjected to the death penalty for any offence related to armed conflict, where 
they are below eighteen years of age at the time the offence was committed.9  Where children 
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below the age of fifteen years are captured while taking a direct part in hostilities, they remain 
subject to special protection regardless of any dispute on prisoner of war status.10   
Notwithstanding the presence of armed conflict, children are entitled to the fullest 
possible range of protections and entitlements accorded them under international human rights 
law.  Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) specifically treats the issue 
of child participation in armed conflict, and accordingly, mandates States Parties to the CRC to 
“respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in 
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child”; “take all feasible measures to ensure that 
persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities”; 
“refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed 
forces”, “[giving] priority to those who are oldest” in recruiting children between the ages of 
fifteen and eighteen”; and “take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children 
who are affected by an armed conflict.”11  Following the conclusion of armed conflicts, States 
continue to have duties to “take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological 
recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of any form of neglect, exploitation or abuse, 
torture or any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or armed 
conflicts.”12   
Among many of the CRC’s fundamental rights, those most applicable to the 
circumstances faced by child soldiers include “the right of the child to be protected from 
economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to 
interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral or social development;”13 as well as the duty of States to “prevent the use of 
children in the illicit production and trafficking of [narcotic drugs and psychotropic] 
substances”;14 protect children against sexual exploitation, sexual abuse,15 and all other forms of 
exploitation prejudicial to the child’s welfare;16 prevent the sale and trafficking of children;17 and 
                                                            
10  Art. 77, para. 3, Protocol I. 
11  Article 38, Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) 
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to ensure treatment of the child with humanity and respect for inherent dignity of a human 
person, “taking into account the needs of persons of his or her age”.18  The Optional Protocol to 
the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict more extensively implements these 
protections by requiring States to: 1) ensure that their members of their armed forces under 
eighteen years of age do not take a direct part in hostilities; 2) raise the minimum age for 
voluntary recruitment into the armed forces from fifteen to eighteen years of age; 3) ban 
compulsory recruitment of persons below the age of eighteen; 4) and prohibit independent armed 
groups within their territories from recruiting persons below eighteen.19  To date, there are 131 
States Parties to this Optional Protocol.20 
According to the 2008 Child Soldiers Global Report (CSG Report),21 despite the 
increased internationalization of legal protections to prevent child soldiering, tens of thousands 
(although possibly reduced from initial estimates of around 300,000 in 2001) of child soldiers 
continue to be actively involved in armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), India, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, and Uganda.  The decrease in child soldiering might be 
attributed, in some degree, to the collective efforts of international institutions.  From 1999 to 
2005, the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 
(2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005), which collectively design a system of mechanisms and 
programs for country-specific and region-specific fact-finding, reportorial, periodic review, 
support, and monitoring of States’ compliance with international obligations on child 
soldiering.22  During the 2003 “Children in the Crossfire” Conference organized by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
17  Article 35, CRC. 
18  Article 37, CRC. 
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54/263, Annex I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000), entered into 
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20  See status as of 26 January 2010 at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-b&chapter=4&lang=en 
(last visited 26 January 2010). 
21  CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008, COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS [hereafter, “2008 
CSG Report”], complete report available online at 
http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/files/country_pdfs/FINAL_2008_Global_Report.pdf (last visited 
10 January 2010). 
22  Security Council resolution 1261, S/RES/1261(1999), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/248/59/PDF/N9924859.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
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International Labour Organization (ILO), then ILO Director General Juan Somavia proposed a 
three-point battle plan to prevent and end the use of children in armed conflict:  “1) improving 
enforcement to go beyond conventions and laws.  Awareness raising, adopting and implementing 
legislation in policies and practice are key elements; 2) developing practical, targeted strategies 
to help children overcome their trauma and prepare for a better future, such as counselling, 
education, vocational training, assistance to parents to boost incomes and get decent jobs; and 3) 
a development strategy to get at the root causes, including promoting social and economic 
reconstruction, poverty eradication, employment and education policies.”23  The ILO had long 
categorized child soldiering among the “worst forms of child labour” in ILO Convention No. 
182,24 an international treaty ratified by around 165 States,25 and which obligates States Parties 
to take preventive and remedial measures against the worst forms of child labour.  In 2007, 76 
States, which included conflict-ridden countries, committed themselves under the Paris 
Commitments and Paris Guidelines to observe common guidelines on the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of all categories of children associated with armed groups.26 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
2010); Security Council resolution 1314, S/RES/1314 (2000), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/604/03/PDF/N0060403.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010); Security Council resolution 1379, S/RES/1379 (2001), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/651/10/PDF/N0165110.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010); Security Council resolution 1460, S/RES/1460 (2003) (“Children and armed conflict”), 30 January 
2003, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/231/16/PDF/N0323116.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010); Security Council resolution 1539, S/RES/1539 (2004) (“Children and Armed Conflict”), 22 April 
2004, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/318/63/PDF/N0431863.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010); Security Council resolution 1612, S/RES/1612 (2005) (“Children and Armed Conflict”), 26 July 
2005, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/439/59/PDF/N0543959.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010). 
23  ILO Communication and Public Information Unit, “ILO concern: the unbearable fate of child soldiers”, 23 
May 2003, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Feature_stories/lang--
en/WCMS_075611/index.htm (last visited 10 January 2010). 
24  Art. 3(a) of ILO Convention No. 182 (“Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for 
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour”), 17 June 1999. 
25  ILO Committee on Legal Issues and International Labour Standards, “Ratification and promotion of 
fundamental ILO Conventions”, GB.300/LILS/7 300th session, November 2007.  Available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_084298.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010). 
26  See Paris Principles, February 2007, available at 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/parisprinciples/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf (last visited 10 
January 2010); Paris Commitments, February 2007, available at 
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Child soldier enlistment has also been subject of international prosecution.  Admittedly, 
neither statute of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR) explicitly mentioned the crime of child soldier enlistment.  However, 
subsequent international tribunals have since recognized child soldier enlistment as a war crime. 
The first international decision on child recruitment began with the May 2004 decision of the 
Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Hinga Norman case.27 In Hinga 
Norman, the Appeals Chamber defined child recruitment as the conscription, enlistment and use 
of children under 15 years of age to participate in hostilities, which, according to the Chamber, 
had already been outlawed as part of customary international law since at least 1996.28 A year 
later, the International Criminal Court (ICC) featured the crime of child soldier enlistment in the 
first set of issued arrest warrants against members of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
Uganda,29 and members of armed groups in the DRC.30  On 26 January 2009, the ICC 
commenced trial in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubyanga Dyilo, where the accused is charged 
with “enlisting and conscripting of children under the age of 15 years into the Forces 
patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo [Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo] and using 
them to participate actively in hostilities in the context of an international armed conflict from 
early September 2002 to 2 June 2003”, and of “enlisting and conscripting children under the age 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/pariscommitments/ParisCommitments_EN.pdf  (10 
January 2010). 
27  Prosecutor v. Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on lack of Jurisdiction (Child 
Recruitment), Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E) (May 31,2004). 
28  See Alison Smith, Child Recruitment and the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Justice (2004), 
1141-1153. 
29  The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, ICC-02/04-01/05-53, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0204/Related+Cases/ICC+0204+0105/
Court+Records/Chambers/Pre+Trial+Chamber+II/Warrant+of+Arrest+for+Joseph+Kony+issued+on+8th+
July+2005+as+amended+on+27th+September+2005.htm (last visited 10 January 2010). 
30  The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-02/06, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/Related+Cases/ICC+0104+0206/
Court+Records/Chambers/Pre+Trial+Chamber+I/Warrant+of+arrest.htm (last visited 10 January 2010); 
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of 15 years into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the context of an 
armed conflict not of an international character from 2 June 2003 to 13 August 2003.”31   
Despite the wide net of international legal prohibitions now operative and the direct 
involvement of top-tier international organizations and institutions seised of the matter,32 
however, child soldiering remains a persistent practice in many ongoing armed conflicts around 
the world.  The 2008 CSG Report observes that while some progress has been made in reducing 
the incidence of child soldiering from the end of conflicts in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 
and the signing of peace agreements in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Nepal and Southern 
Sudan, children continue to be recruited and used by paramilitaries, militias, civilian defence 
forces or armed groups linked to, supported by, or acting as proxies for governments in Chad, 
Colombia, Myanmar, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, India, Iran, Libya, the 
DRC, and Côte d’Ivoire.33  All of the previously-discussed international instruments 
comprehensively propose long-term strategies to reducing the incidence of child soldiering, but 
they are by no means complete.  The gravitas of most of these measures lies in the legal 
formalization of prohibitions, but which are contingent on States’ individual modes of 
implementation of the international prohibitions against child soldiering. Likewise, the nature 
and scale of the internal or international armed conflicts prevailing will also affect the method 
and capability of a State to enforce such international prohibitions against child soldiering.  In a 
situation where both government armed forces and non-state armed groups are known to have 
                                                            
31  The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubyanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%20
0104%200106/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo?lan=en-GB (last visited 10 January 2010).  
See also “Use of child soldiers ‘particularly abusive’, UN expert testifies”, UN News Centre, 7 January 
2010, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33418 (last visited 10 January 2010). 
32  See among others OAU Resolution Of The Plight of African Children in Situation of Armed Conflicts, 
CM/RES.1659 (LXIV) REV. 1 available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/african/docs/cm/cm58.doc 
(last visited 10 January 2010); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, O.A.U. Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990); Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and 
Armed Conflict, Proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 3318(XXIX) of 14 December 1974; Elements 
of Crimes for the International Criminal Court, UN doc. ICC-ASP/1/3; Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Children, Impact of armed conflict on children, Note by the Secretary-General, GA Res. 
A/51/306 (26 Aug. 1996) (Report of Graça Machel); Cape Town Principles and Best Practices, Adopted at 
the Symposium on the Prevention of Children into Armed Forces and Demobilisation and Social 
Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa, UNICEF (27-30 Apr. 1997), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf (last visited 10 January 2010); 
Montevideo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers, Latin American and Caribbean Conference on 
the Use of Children as Soldiers, UNESCO (8 July 1999), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/montevideo.htm (last visited 10 January 2010). 
33  2008 CSG Report, at pp. 18-24. 
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enlisted child soldiers, it is difficult to see how the international prohibitions will be 
implemented fully and effectively, without ultimately having to fall back on the self-imposed 
restraint of the combating groups.   
The continued proliferation of child soldiering evidences a fundamental disconnect 
between the root causes of child soldiering, and the current range of international mechanisms 
and strategies used.  Criminal prosecutions and international legal sanctions, while laudable, will 
likely have an attenuated effect on reducing the incidence of child soldiering in armed conflicts 
across the globe.  These measures operate on an ex post paradigm,34 and do little to cripple the 
immediate operational network and policy considerations of field commanders or armed groups 
that do enlist child soldiers.  As the 2008 CSG Report acknowledges, “some armed groups and 
their leaders appear to attach little value to international law and display little inclination to 
adhere to it.  The military imperatives of the group and the political, economic, and social factors 
that drive conflicts and cause children to enlist --- often underpinned by local cultural attitudes 
towards the age of majority --- can outweigh legal and moral arguments.”35  Due to their 
malleability in assuming either direct combatant or logistical support roles, and with their unique 
psychological attributes, armed groups deliberately enlist child soldiers to advance short-term or 
immediate military objectives.36  One author notes that “[d]epending on the context, child 
soldiers may serve as sentries, bodyguards, porters, domestic labourers, medics, guards, sex 
slaves, spies, cooks, mine sweepers, or recruiters.  Roles may vary significantly by age and 
gender. For example, smaller, younger children often serve as spies.  Girl soldiers perform the 
same wide variety of roles performed by boy soldiers, and in African countries commanders 
frequently seek girls because of their impressive capacities for portaging heavy loads.  Girl 
soldiers also are frequently sought for purposes of sexual exploitation, as are boys in some 
                                                            
34  See Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of International Criminal Prosecutions in Africa, 31 Fordham Int’l 
L. J. 343 (January 2008); Benedetto Croce, Against International Post-War Tribunals, 5 J. of Int’l Crim 
Justice (2007), 1029-1030; James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of 
Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 Vill. L. Rev. 1 (2009), at 10-19. 
35  2008 CSG Report, at p. 24. 
36  Susan Tiefenbrun, Child Soldiers, Slavery, and the Trafficking of Children, TJSL Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 1020341, October 2007, at pp. 17-19.  Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020341 (last visited 
10 January 2010), 31 Fordham Int’l L. J. 415 (2008). 
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contexts.”37  At any given moment, and depending on the armed group’s operational needs, a 
child soldier can be exploited for virtually every imaginable form of child labour.   
 
With these considerations in mind, I propose a complementary strategy to existing 
international approaches to stop child soldiering.  Apart from targeting the grassroots causes of 
child soldiering and facilitating the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers to their 
respective communities after the cessation of hostilities, I propose that we also consider the use 
of current international economic norms to permit States to specifically discriminate against and 
target the economic structures that incentivize armed groups to use, and continue using, child 
soldiers.  As previously discussed, child soldiering is, in practice, a euphemism for a broad range 
of activities that children may be compelled to undertake in armed conflicts. While children may 
be particularly useful on the frontlines wielding contemporary light weapons (such as M16 and 
AK-47 assault rifles), hand grenades, landmines, and other cheap and widely available 
explosives,38 their physical attributes and aptitude for learning skills are equally advantageous 
for economic activities which are contemporaneously undertaken to finance the operations of 
armed groups.39   In modern armed conflicts, these economic activities can include diamond, oil, 
and other forms of natural resource mining,40 opium and coca cultivation,41 and drug 
trafficking.42  From the time a child is recruited into an armed group, he or she is vulnerable to 
                                                            
37  MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS:  FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION (Harvard University Press, 2006), 
at p. 8. 
38  ALCINDA HONWANA, CHILD SOLDIERS IN AFRICA (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), at p. 31.  See 
“Strong link between child soldiers and the small arms trade, UN experts say”, UN News Centre, 15 July 
2008, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27382&Cr=child&Cr1=soldier (last 
visited 10 January 2010). 
39  See Tiefenbraun, at 433; Sandrine Valentine, Trafficking of Child Soldiers: Expanding the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict, 9 New Eng. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 109 (2003). 
40  HAPPOLD, at 11.  See also Michael L. Ross, Oil, Drugs and Diamonds:  The Varying Roles of Natural 
Resources in Civil War, pp. 47-67 [hereafter, “Ross article”] in KAREN BALLENTINE AND JAKE SHERMAN 
(EDS.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARMED CONFLICT:  BEYOND GREED AND GRIEVANCE (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 2003) [hereafter, BALLENTINE & SHERMAN] 
41  See 2008 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labour – Colombia, 10 September 2009, at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USDOL,,COL,,4aba3ee88,0.html (last visited 10 January 2010);  
42  See Testimony of Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow, International Strategy and Assessment Center, before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, “Confronting Drug Trafficking 
in West Africa”, June 23, 2009, available at 
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/FarahTestimony090623a.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010); Paul 
Rexton Kan, Drug Intoxicated Irregular Fighters:  Complications, Dangers, and Responses, Strategic 
Studies Institute, March 2008, available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub850.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010). 
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assuming interchangeable roles as a direct combatant in the hostilities, or as a forced participant 
in the economic activities that finance and sustain the armed group’s capability to wage war.  In 
order to truly give effect to international legal responsibilities of prevention against child 
soldiering, States must also take measures to ensure that they do not accept or facilitate the entry 
into their territories of child soldier-produced, distributed, and/or trafficked goods that benefit 
and finance armed groups. 
Part I examines the financing of contemporary armed groups through trade of both 
facially-licit goods (such as diamonds, gold, minerals, oil, and other natural resources), and 
prohibited substances such as opium and cocaine. I show that international regulation to enforce 
bans on both types of goods qualitatively differ in terms of scope, the binding nature of such 
regulations, as well as the sanctions available under the international system.  Despite criticisms 
on its implementation, the more developed international regulatory framework and institutional 
coordination fostered under the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances,43 coupled with States’ own enforcement of their respective 
domestic laws on prohibited substances, makes it more costly for armed groups to sustainably 
finance their conflict operations from cross-border trafficking of prohibited substances.  It would 
be easier for States to collaterally enforce international prohibitions on child soldiering in 
relation to contraband or prohibited substances, since these goods are already banned per se at 
the State’s territorial borders. Without having to verify that child soldiers were used to produce 
or distribute contraband goods or prohibited substances, States already exercise their respective 
customs jurisdiction to ban these prohibited or contraband goods from entering their borders.   
Moreover, when armed groups use child soldiers to facilitate cross-border drug 
trafficking, the established system of international regulatory cooperation and coordination 
among States also enables early detection of child soldiers at the border.  At that threshold of 
early detection, States can already devise and implement measures to ensure child soldiers’ 
demobilization and safe reintegration into their home communities, among other duties 
incumbent upon them under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the involvement of children in armed conflict.  While child soldier detection at territorial 
                                                            
43  United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 
1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 I.L.M. 497. 
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borders raises its own corresponding set of immigration issues for States,44 in these situations 
States at least possess clearer factual bases before them to implement the international 
prohibitions against child soldiering. 
International regulation appears more elusive when armed groups use child soldiers for 
the production and distribution of facially-licit goods such as diamonds, oil, and other natural 
resources.45  Private buyers of diamonds, oil, and other resources cannot be expected to 
investigate and determine for themselves if such goods originated from armed groups, or more 
so, if such goods had been produced and distributed using child soldiers.  For an international 
ban to be effective at targeting these particular sources of financing of armed groups, States must 
be able to ensure that banned facially-licit goods are imputable to, or identifiable with, an armed 
group that uses child soldiers in the production or distribution of such goods.  However, at 
present, there is no international system or set of protocols for distinguishing child soldier-
produced or distributed goods from legitimate trade in goods. 
To date, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds (“KPCS”) is 
the only known attempt to enforce quantitative restrictions or bans to curb the financing of armed 
conflicts. The KPCS is a non-binding “soft law” instrument banning the export and import of 
rough diamonds to and from non-participants in the certification scheme.  Participating 
governments in the KPCS certify that rough diamond shipments are free of “conflict diamonds”, 
defined by the UN General Assembly as rough diamonds “used by rebel movements to finance 
their military activities, including the attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate 
governments.”46  Participating countries in KPCS can only trade rough diamonds with fellow 
participants.  They must also pass legislation that devises control systems for the export and 
import of rough diamonds.  As observed by the United States Government Accountability 
Office, “[t]o succeed, KPCS depends on all participants having strong control systems and 
                                                            
44  See Jennifer C. Everett, The Battle Continues: Fighting for a More Child-Sensitive Approach to Asylum for 
Child Soldiers, 21 Fla. J. Int’l L. 285 (August 2009). 
45  See Asif Efrat, A Theory of Internationally Regulated Goods, 32 Fordham J. Int’l L. J. 1466 (May 2009).  
46  UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56 (“The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link 
between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and 
settlement of conflicts”), A/RES/55/56, 29 January 2001, available at http://daccess-dds-




procedures for collecting and sharing trade data on rough diamonds, for inspecting imports and 
exports of these diamonds, and for tracking confirmations of import and export receipts.”47 
On its face, the KPCS appears to contravene core norms of the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), such as prohibitions against quantitative restrictions [GATT Art. 
XI(1)], the principle of non-discrimination [GATT Art. XIII(1)], and the most-favoured nation 
clause [GATT Art. I(1)].  Pursuant to its authority under Article IX(3) of the WTO Agreement, 
and taking into consideration UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56 which specifically called 
on the international community to create a “simple and workable international certification 
scheme for rough diamonds”,48 the WTO General Council issued a waiver in May 2003 to 
suspend the operation of these GATT prohibitions for WTO Member States that participate in 
the KPCS.49  Notwithstanding international cooperation at this level, however, the inherently 
non-binding nature of the KPCS, along with its lack of systematic monitoring and enforcement, 
lends weight to the criticism that it has not succeeded in eliminating the flow of conflict 
diamonds, particularly in the Republic of Congo.50 
  Against its unique genesis and still-unproven record in segregating conflict diamonds 
from legitimate diamond trade, it is difficult to replicate the KPCS as a general paradigm for 
enforcing international prohibitions against child soldiering.  For one, the KPCS creates a 
certification system specific to the diamond trade, while armed groups’ trade in facially-licit 
goods produced with the labour of child soldiers are not limited to diamond resources.  Second, a 
voluntary certification system such as the KPCS does not authoritatively determine the 
provenance of a good. Where the origin of State-certified rough diamonds is disputed, the KPCS 
does not contain any definitive procedure for resolving the controversy. As a self-regulatory 
system dependent on the voluntary participation of diamond-trading States, enforcement of 
                                                            
47  United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, “Conflict 
Diamonds:  Agency Actions Needed to Enhance the Implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade Act”, 
September 2006, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06978.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010). 
48  UN G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (2001). 
49  Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political Debate on the 
Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 615 (2009); Karen E. Woody, Diamonds on the 
Souls of Her Shoes: The Kimberley Process and the Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions, 22 Conn. J. 
Int’l L. 335 (2007). 
50  Seth A. Malamut, A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the Kimberley Process and Diamond-
Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 29 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 25 (2005); See 
Haley Blaire Goldman, Between a ROC and a Hard Place: The Republic of Congo’s Illicit Trade in 
Diamonds and Efforts to Break the Cycle of Corruption, 30 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 359 (Fall 2008). 
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quantitative restrictions and/or outright bans cannot be compelled.  Finally and most importantly, 
it would have to take another Article IX(3) waiver decision from the WTO General Council to 
authorize any such certification system for facially-licit goods produced and distributed through 
the labour of child soldiers. There is no assurance that a new waiver decision of this nature could 
be obtained under the same substantial international political consensus as the Kimberley 
Process.  Mobilizing an influential majority within the WTO system in support of such a waiver 
would require more States to expend political resources and allocate favours that they may need 
for their respective ongoing trade negotiations.51   
In light of the contested dynamics of current international legal regulation on the trading 
activities of armed groups, I propose in Part II that States could also act on their own capacity, 
under the authority of the exceptions provisions in GATT Articles XX (General Exceptions) and 
XXI (Security Exceptions), to ban or restrict trade in goods attributable to armed groups that use 
the labour of child soldiers, without violating WTO principles and the GATT norms on non-
discrimination, most-favoured nation treatment, and the prohibition against quantitative 
restrictions.  These provisions enable WTO Member States to vindicate core societal values and 
interests through trade-restrictive measures that would otherwise violate multilateral trading 
rules.  I contend that trade restrictions on goods produced through the labour of child soldiers 
apply the international duties of States under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, to “take all feasible 
measures to prevent [their] recruitment and use”,52 and to “take all necessary measures to ensure 
the effective implementation and enforcement of the provisions” of ILO Convention No. 182.53  
In my proposal, States could be justified in banning or otherwise restricting trade in child soldier-
produced or distributed goods as a measure “necessary to protect public morals” under GATT 
Article XX(a), or as a GATT Article XX(b)(ii) measure “necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests relating to the traffic in arms, ammunitions, and implements of war 
and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a military establishment.”54 I submit that this proposal does not contradict 
                                                            
51  On the structural problems of decision-making rules in the WTO, see Debra P. Steger, The Future of the 
WTO: The Case for Institutional Reform, 12 J. Int’l Econ. L.803 (2009), at 808-814. 
52  Art. 4, Optional Protocol. 
53  Arts. 7(1) and 7(2), ILO Convention No. 182. 
54  Italics supplied. 
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the nascent trend of WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence, which interprets General Exceptions 
(GATT Article XX) and Security Exceptions (Article XXI) provisions according to multi-tiered 
tests that correlate the general chapeau of the provision, the necessary measure, and the objective 
purposes of these exceptions provisions.  Finally, I submit that State-imposed bans can be 
checked and duly challenged within the framework of the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism, 
unlike the KPCS which does not contain a precise procedure to contest a State’s certification. 
Part III closes the analysis with a brief review of current international methods to stop 
child soldiering, which focus on a common objective of monitoring and punishing armed groups 
for the direct participation of children in hostilities.  I situate my proposal within the assumption 
that armed groups recruit children for their ability to assume diverse roles in armed conflicts.  
Terminating the financing sources of armed groups from trade in child soldier-produced goods is 
one possible way to further disincentivize the recruitment of children in war.  In protracted 
armed conflicts sustained by an armed group’s economic dependence on trade in facially-licit 
goods produced or distributed through armed groups’ use of child soldiers, State-imposed bans 
are necessary components to a comprehensive global strategy against child soldiering. By 
imposing these bans, States could also argue that they act in fulfilment of their explicit 
international responsibilities, under the relevant international conventions and Security Council 
resolutions, to prevent and dismantle situations of impunity that make it conducive, in the first 
place, to enlist and subjugate children to military duties and economic labours that perpetuate 
armed conflicts.  
I. TRADE IN GOODS AND THE FINANCING OF ARMED GROUPS 
Since the end of the Cold War, armed groups and government forces alike more 
frequently rely on revenues from trade in goods to finance their operations in armed conflicts.  A 
survey of armed conflicts from 1994-2001 observes that ‘[t]he resources most frequently linked 
to civil conflict are diamonds and other gemstones (seven conflicts, all of them civil wars); oil 
and natural gas (seven conflicts, six of them civil wars); illicit drugs (five conflicts, all of them 
civil wars); and timber (three conflicts, all of them civil wars).  Legal agricultural crops played a 
role in two conflicts (both civil wars), although in each case other natural resources played larger 
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roles.”55  Steady decreases in post-Cold War foreign assistance to governments and armed 
groups have impelled them to seek private sources of funding to finance their military activities.  
Armed groups today draw funding from multiple revenue sources, such as lucrative trade in 
natural resources like timber, oil, and other facially-licit goods; proceeds from criminal activities; 
and diversion of relief aid. The strategic value of natural resource assets, as both tools and 
objectives to maintain the power dynamics in favour of armed groups, has led to a “growing 
concern that whereas resources were once a means of funding and waging armed conflict for 
states to a political end, armed conflict is increasingly becoming the means to individual 
commercial ends: gaining access to valuable resources.”56  While the UN Security Council has 
used its sanctioning power over the past two decades to effectuate embargoes in armed conflicts, 
sanctions have not always been timely, nor specifically targeted against the trading capacity of 
armed groups for facially-licit goods.  Commodity sanctions, for example, have been sparingly 
imposed, and usually only in tandem with other peacekeeping measures, as was done in 
Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire.57 In 2007, the UN 
Secretary-General recommended to the UN Security Council that it consider imposing targeted 
measures against parties to armed conflict who continue to systematically commit grave 
violations against children, including “a ban on the export or supply of arms, a ban on military 
assistance, the imposition of travel restrictions on leaders, their exclusion from any governance 
                                                            
55  Ross article, at p.48. 
56  See Philippe le Billon, The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts, 20 Political 




rlVersion=0&_userid=483702&md5=bde57bc8a6bcfba161e0715167367fdb  (last visited 10 January 2010). 
57  UN SC resolution 792, S/RES/792, 30 November 1992, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/760/95/IMG/N9276095.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010); UN SC resolution 1173, S/RES/1173, 12 June 1998, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/166/52/PDF/N9816652.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010); UN SC resolution 1306, S/RES/1306, 5 July 2000 available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/517/01/PDF/N0051701.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010); UN SC resolution 1333, S/RES/1333, 19 December 2000, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/806/62/PDF/N0080662.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 10 January 
2010); UN SC resolution 1343, S/RES/1343, 7 March 2001, available at http://daccess-dds-
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structures and amnesty provisions, and restriction of the flow of financial resources to the parties 
concerned.”58 
What is most disturbing in the changed complexion of financing for armed conflicts is the 
increasing long-term convertibility of child soldiers, from being direct participants in hostilities, 
to abused labourers in armed groups’ diverse economic activities.  It is not unheard of for a child 
to participate in direct combat during internecine conflict, and to revert to resource extraction, 
mining, and trafficking activities for the armed group during temporary ceasefires.  In Myanmar, 
children as young as 9 years old are enlisted: “[i]n some cases, children were taken from their 
parents under the guise of wanting to give them educational opportunities, but they were in fact 
placed in military schools and expected to join the army. Children are given the same basic 
training as other soldiers, but if they are not strong enough to carry their own guns or backpacks 
they can be kept in battalion camps for months or years. If they are too young to be sent out on 
operations (ie under the age of 12 or 13), they can be used as forced labor on projects such as 
digging roads, taking care of animals or cutting grass and bushes.”59   
Children’s interchanging roles are also exacerbated when conflicts metamorphose into 
situations of instability for an indeterminate duration, often involving “cross-border operations of 
armed opposition groups, the international and local arms trade, and the sale of natural resources, 
narcotics, and other commodities used to sponsor conflict. Around centres of conflict, there are 
often extended zones of “bounded instability” which experience sporadic violence. Long-term 
situations of “neither peace nor war” can therefore ensue.”60  Where the prolonged conduct of 
war blurs the lines between direct hostilities and support or financing activities, armed groups 
                                                            
58  Report of the Secretary-General (“Children and armed conflict”), 21 December 2007, General Assembly 
sixty-second session, at para. 163, available at http://www.crin.org/docs/SG2008.pdf (last visited 10 
January 2010).  (Italics supplied.) 
59  “The Impact of Armed Conflict on the Children of Burma”, August 2002 Submission by the Burma UN 
Service Office – New York & the Human Rights Documentation Unit, National Coalition Government of 
the Union of Burma to the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict for the preparation of the Secretary-General’s third report to the Security Council on 
children and armed conflict, on the implementation of resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), and 1379 
(2001), available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs3/BURMA-
submission_to_office_for_children_and_armed_conflict.htm (last visited 10 January 2010). 
60  Peter Saundry (ed.), Environmental and socioeconomic impacts of armed conflict in Africa, 17 October 
2008, available at 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Environmental_and_socioeconomic_impacts_of_armed_conflict_in_Africa 
(last visited 10 January 2010). 
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easily utilize child soldiers for one form of labour to the other, depending on operational 
expedience and military necessity. 
 For these reasons, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Children and 
Armed Conflict reports that child soldiers are especially vulnerable in contemporary asset or 
resource wars, where their roles have indefinitely expanded beyond direct participation in 
hostilities to forced labour: “The illicit exploitation of natural resources in zones of conflict, has 
a direct and significant bearing on children. They are exploited as cheap labour and forced to 
work in unhealthy and dangerous conditions with devastating consequences for their future. This 
practice of plunder is robbing children of their birthright to education, healthcare and 
development. Moreover, this has become a principal means of fuelling and prolonging conflicts 
in which children suffer the most. Closely related to the grey area in which criminality and 
politically motivated action intersect is the phenomenon of asset or resource wars, where conflict 
often revolves around the control of territory or the State apparatus as a direct means of 
commanding natural resources such as oil, diamonds, gold, coltan, timber or cocoa. Empirical 
evidence indicates that in these asset wars there are often a multiplicity of actors vying for a 
stake, from government-armed forces and armed groups opposed to the State, to international 
interests such as other States, multinational corporations and criminal cartels. There is often also 
close interlinkage with other lucrative and mainly illicit trade such as in weapons and drugs, 
which serves to fuel and prolong conflict. Beyond conscription as soldiers and other categories 
of grave violations, children may also be forced to labour in mining activities or be exposed to 
criminal networks engaged in child trafficking.”61  The further use of child soldiers for economic 
activities supporting armed groups has been reported in Africa, Asia, and Latin America:  
“In many regions, armed conflicts are financed through the illicit 
exploitation and trade in natural resources and precious minerals like diamonds, 
gold and timber, but also in narcotics.  Child soldiers have been used to protect 
the mining and other extractive operations, since the parties to the conflict rely on 
the exploitation and marketing of the resources, sometimes with the cooperation 
of the private sector and neighbouring countries.  In sub-Saharan Africa, the illicit 
trade in diamonds has financed civil wars in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.  
In Colombia, Myanmar and Afghanistan drugs are traded by many parties in the 
                                                            
61  UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, 
“Impact on children of illicit exploitation of natural resources in conflict zones”, available at 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/exploitation.html (last visited 10 January 2010). 
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armed conflicts.  In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, parties to armed 
conflict exploit gold, diamonds, timber and coltan --- an important resource in 
high-technology industries --- and export those resources illegally across the 
country’s borders.” 62 
 
 
As will be shown in the subsections below, there is a clear disparity in the nature of 
international regulation affecting armed groups’ trade in contraband goods and prohibited 
substances, and their trade in facially-licit goods and commodities.  While the former is covered 
by a rigorous international cooperative network policing the trade of such goods, States have not 
yet reached internationally binding measures on facially-licit goods and commodities. (The 
KPCS, as previously discussed, is not an internationally obligatory system.)  Instead, States have 
tended to await UN Security Council action imposing trade embargoes on facially-licit goods 
and commodities in relation to armed conflicts, before implementing any such bans or 
quantitative restrictions in their territories. 
 
A. International regulation on armed groups’ trade in prohibited substances 
 Armed conflicts create numerous opportunities and incentives for armed groups to trade 
in contraband goods and prohibited substances, so much so, that “whatever posture they assume -
-- either as guerrillas turning into criminals or as members of mafias with an alliance of crime 
and revolution --- [they create] mutual resources of monies and weapons to the war machines of 
terror, counterterror, revolution, and counterrevolution.  The links between crime and terrorist 
insurrections masquerading as revolutions appear to be growing stronger and also perpetrate 
conflicts that encourage terrorism and make peace more elusive.”63  Illicit trade, however, can be 
undertaken by both States and rebel groups within a State:  “[i]n one case (Peru), only the rebels 
systematically raised money from the drug trade.  In the other cases, both sides earned money 
from drugs --- in two cases (Afghanistan and Burma) because the government was willing to 
endure international sanctions, and in the third case (Colombia) because drug revenues were 
                                                            
62  Lilian Peters, War is No Child’s Play: Child Soldiers from Battlefield to Playground, July 2005, Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, at p. 10, available at 
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/.../op08_war-child.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010). 
63  ROBERT J. KELLY, JESS MAGHAN, AND JOSEPH D. SERIO, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 
(ABC CLIO Contemporary World Issues Series, 2005), at 14. 
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collected by paramilitary forces, which were allied with the government but sufficiently 
independent from it (at least nominally) to allow the government to avoid international 
sanctions.”64  Child soldiers are especially useful to armed groups engaged in the drug trade, 
since drugs, like diamonds, gold, and other gemstones, are “easily extracted and transported by 
individuals or small teams of unskilled workers.”65   
Three international treaties comprehensively promote international cooperation to police 
and criminalize trafficking in illegal drugs and other prohibited substances:  1) the 1988 UN 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, with around 
170 States Parties; 2) the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, with about 180 States 
Parties; and 3) the 1976 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, with about 175 States 
Parties.66  Under these conventions, States harmonize rules criminalizing the use, possession, 
sale, production, manufacture, and trafficking of various types of illegal drugs, under combined 
international schedules of prohibited substances and quantities of such substances.67  Among 
these conventions, the 1988 Convention specifically qualifies the gravity of offences in relation 
to trafficking of illegal drugs as “particularly serious”, when they involve the “victimization or 
use of minors.”68  All three conventions establish interrelated rules on subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction;69 standardized procedures for determining the estimation, cultivation, and 
confiscation of prohibited substances;70 legal and administrative cooperation among States in 
                                                            
64  Ross article, at 63. 
65  Alexandra Guáqueta, The Colombian Conflict:  Political and Economic Dimensions, pp. 73-106, at 91 in 
BALLENTINE & SHERMAN. 
66  United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 
1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 I.L.M. 497, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf 
(last visited 10 January 2010) [hereafter, “1988 UN Drug Convention”]; United Nations Convention Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961), Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151, available at 
http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/convention_1961_en.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010) [hereafter, “1961 
UN Drug Convention]; United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 
U.N.T.S. 175, available at http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/convention_1971_en.pdf (last visited 10 
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67  See “Red List” in the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the “Yellow List” in the 1961 UN Drug Convention, and 
the “Green List” in the 1971 UN Drug Convention. 
68  Art. 3(5)(f), 1988 UN Drug Convention. 
69  Art. 4 et seq., 1988 UN Drug Convention; Art. 4 et seq., 1961 UN Drug Convention; Arts. 2-7, 1971 UN 
Drug Convention. 
70  Art. 5 et seq., 1988 UN Drug Convention; Arts. 19-21, 22-24, 36-37, 1961 UN Drug Convention. 
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actions against the illicit traffic of such substances;71 customs, trade, and commercial regulation, 
including permitted quantities of such substances for medical or scientific purposes;72 and the 
settlement of disputes.73   
Most importantly, all three conventions operate under common centralized international 
authorities and institutions such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations, and the International Narcotics Control Board.  While 
these international conventions have not completely eradicated drug trafficking, they have 
contributed significantly to international efforts to dismantle drug trafficking groups and curb the 
illegal drug trade.  Until the 1988 UN Drug Convention, anti-drug trafficking measures were 
largely dependent on national initiatives.  International cooperation under the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention innovated mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions, confiscations, 
extradition, controlled deliveries and money laundering into a coherent international regime.74   
Under the established system of international cooperation, information-sharing, and 
regulatory protocols against illegal trafficking, States have the means, not just to apprehend the 
illicit entry of prohibited substances within their borders, but also to investigate and determine 
the origin of such substances.  Transnational investigations have led to the detection of child 
soldier involvement and participation in the production, use and/or trafficking of prohibited 
substances, as in Brazil,75 Colombia,76 Myanmar,77 and Africa.78 In the past decade, this 
interlinkage between child soldiering and illegal drug trafficking has become much clearer in 
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internal armed conflicts, civil disturbances and urban unrest, and transnational criminal 
activities.79  As one author contends:  “[a]s most of these governments, movements, or armed 
groups do not have access to the free global economy the situation is only exacerbated by the 
fact that these actors must often fund their war efforts through illegal channels.  Rebel groups 
and non-state actors may resort to plundering and blackmailing civilian populations for sources 
of finance....[t]he children abducted or enrolled in armed groups are, in numerous cases, held 
under influence by alcohol, drugs, or other substances...We will therefore argue that the fight 
against child soldiers necessitates increased cooperation and collaboration in the fight against 
drugs and crime: from narcotics to corruption, illegal traffics, and small arms smuggling.”80  The 
1988 UN Drug Convention recognizes the practical utility of children to illegal drug trafficking, 
and as such, enables States’ domestic courts to consider the “involvement of the offender in other 
international organized criminal activities”, “involvement of the offender in other illegal 
activities facilitated by the commission of the offence”, as well as the “victimization or use of 
children,” as qualifying circumstances to merit more severe punishment against drug 
traffickers.81 
 
B. International regulation on armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods 
Child soldiers are also invaluable to sustaining armed groups’ trade in facially-list goods 
such as diamonds, gold, oil, timber, and other natural resources, and legal agricultural crops.  In 
the Philippines, a democracy still besieged by some of the longest-running insurgencies in 
Southeast Asia, paramilitary units and separatist groups give children economic tasks around the 
camp, a form of enlistment where the children could later become combatants.82 The use of 
children in economic activities of armed groups appears more starkly in the Democratic Republic 
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of the Congo (DRC),83 where children have been used repeatedly for mining and quarrying 
activities that help finance the military operations of armed groups.  These cases demonstrate the 
distinct utility children bring to armed groups in a wide spectrum of operations involved in 
conducting a protracted armed conflict.  Apart from serving to augment combat units’ manpower 
in the field, children also comprise the backbone of armed groups’ mining and quarrying 
workforces, particularly sought for their small size, dexterity, trainability, cheap food intake, and 
large supply in impoverished civilian populations.  The International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
attributes this phenomenon to the fact that armed conflicts cause rampant disruptions to regular 
economic activities, leading families and children to seek or accept work in mines and quarries:  
“...child labour in mining is one of those forms of work which is particularly closely associated 
with economic and social disruption.  Even if virtually disappearing for a time, it tends to 
reassert itself when civil wars break out and cut off normal commerce, when drought destroys 
livelihoods or whenever else times get tough.  It usually occurs far from sight: up in the 
mountains or out in the border areas.  And it relocates swiftly, responding to hints and whispers 
of a gold strike here or jobs there...Far from the public eye, children in small-scale mining are 
vulnerable to a panoply of social, psychological, and physical dangers not found in many other 
forms of work.”84  Noting this reality, ILO Convention no. 148 (the Minimum Age Convention) 
permits States Parties to exclude specific categories of work or economic activity from the 
minimum age requirement of 18 years, but specifically bars such States from excluding mining 
and quarrying, which by nature jeopardizes the health and safety of children.85 
Outside of the soft law initiatives under the KPCS for conflict diamonds, and the select 
UN-imposed trade embargoes previously discussed,86 there is no international regulation directly 
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Publishers, 1998), at 267. 
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applicable to armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods such as minerals and commodities.  
Even the KPCS --- which came into effect in January 2003 under a popular climate of 
international and cross-sectional support from key players of the diamond industry, States, 
NGOs, and the UN Security Council’s endorsement under resolution 55/56 – fatally suffers from 
several key design problems.  First, while the certification system depends greatly on the 
reliability of information brought in by participating States in KPCS, there is still no 
“comprehensive system for the gathering and analysis of diamond production and trading 
statistics...[w]ithout a comprehensive database on the production and trade of rough diamonds, 
the KPCS will be unable to identify anomalies or do even the most rudimentary tracking of 
diamond flows.”87  Second, participating States in the KPCS did not reach any consensus 
whatsoever on the international monitoring process to ascertain States’ compliance with their 
unilateral promises under the system.  Third, it was not until April 2003 that the KPCS launched 
membership procedures that tied continuing membership in the system with States’ enactment of 
KPCS-related domestic legislation.  In practice, KPCS does not have any functional sanctions 
that could be imposed against such States other than exclusion from KPCS membership.  
Exclusion, however, would only be counter-productive to the objectives of the KPCS, since it 
would foreclose any possibility of cooperation on stopping the illicit diamond trade, as KPCS 
realized in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo which it expelled in 2004 and 
readmitted in 2007.  By failing to reach any binding agreement among States on these issues and 
subjecting the entire process of compliance to cyclical negotiations among KPCS participants, 
there is little prospect of imposing an “enforcement net” on armed groups’ trade in diamonds that 
come anywhere near the web of international regulation and enforcement cooperation in drug 
trafficking. 
As a result of this gap, foreign companies can continue to purchase minerals and 
commodities, having to comply only with the local customs regulations of States where such 
minerals and commodities are sold, as well as the more general contract obligations between 
buyers and sellers under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods.88  The international 
regulatory gap thus places the burden on individual States to police, monitor, and prevent the 
                                                            
87  Ian Smillie, What Lessons from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?, pp. 47-67 in KAREN 
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entry and exit of armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods in their respective territories.  Absent 
a common set of international rules analogous to the international framework on prohibited 
substances, and without specifically applicable domestic regulations against child soldier-
produced, distributed, assembled and/or manufactured goods, State practice to date has been 
uneven on the enforcement of child soldier prohibitions in relation to trade.  In the DRC, 
multinational companies from Europe, Asia and elsewhere have reportedly been “buying 
minerals from comptoirs known to be trading with armed groups for several years, apparently 
without adjusting their practices in light of the conflict or carrying out sufficient due diligence to 
ensure that their trade is not fuelling the violence.”89  Some of the companies identified as having 
participated in the minerals trade from conflict zones include Belgian companies Trademet, 
Traxys, SDE, STI and Specialty Metals; Thailand Smelting and Refining Corporation (the 
world’s fifth-largest tin producing company) owned by a British metals company, Amalgamated 
Metal Corporation (AMC) Group; MPA, a Rwanda-based subsidiary of South African-owned 
Kivu Resources; African Ventures Ltd in China; Met Trade India Ltd in India; Eurosib Logistics 
JSC in Russia; BEB Investment Inc. in Canada; Novosibirsk Integrated Tin Works in Russia; and 
the Blattner Elwyn Group in the United States.90  The DRC is a particularly significant mining 
resource for tantalum and cassiterite, which is indispensable for making the miniature high-
voltage capacity for circuits in high-end technology goods such as mobile phones, PDAs, 
laptops, video game consoles, among others.  The highest numbers of child soldiers have been 
used in the DRC, where they are interchangeably used for mining operations apart from 
participation in hostilities, numbering “up to 40% of rebel and government forces at the war’s 
height, with more than 10,000 yet to be demobilized.”91 
The 2008 Final Report of the UN’s Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of 
Congo revealed that “a number of mineral-exporting companies, transport companies and fuel 
businesses could be acting as fronts for the CNDP [Congres national pour la defense du people, 
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a “political movement with a military wing called the Congolese National Army].”92  In the same 
Report, the Group of Experts found evidence that “Rwandan authorities have been complicit in 
the recruitment of soldiers, including children”;93 and that virtually all armed groups (primarily 
the CNDP and the PARECO, or Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance) have conducted 
“large-scale child recruitment” and “re-recruitment” of former child soldiers.94  Among its 
recommendations, the Group of Experts strongly urged that “Member States take appropriate 
measures to ensure that exporters and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their 
jurisdiction conduct due diligence on their suppliers and not accept verbal assurances from 
buyers regarding the origin of their product.”95 This recommendation was particularly 
significant, since it implicitly underscored the preventive duties and responsibilities of States 
with respect to armed groups’ global trade in facially-licit goods such as minerals and 
commodities.  This recommendation was based on an entirely different direction from that of 
civil society groups’ advocacy of corporate social responsibility (CSR) within the domestic 
jurisdictional frameworks of States,96 which seeks to establish host State control and 
accountability mechanisms over multinational corporations operating in a State’s territory.  The 
Group of Experts’ recommendation critically recognized that it was the positive duty or 
obligation of States to require proper verification of the origin or provenance of conflict-related 
goods.  Unlike CSR mechanisms which are negotiated, mobilized, and mediated within States, 
the Group of Experts’ recommendation was landmark, since what it implied was that States held 
a shared international obligation to prevent inadvertently contributing to the financing of groups 
in armed conflicts through international trade.   
The Group of Experts’ recommendation should also not be classed with the KPCS system 
on conflict diamonds.  As previously discussed, the KPCS system depends on the voluntary 
participation of States in its certification process.  Its constitutive processes are not legally 
binding on States, and neither are its deliberations transparent to the international community. 
States cannot, as a matter of right, require the disclosure of information in relation to the 
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2008, at paras. 19 and 32. [hereafter, “2008 Group of Experts Final Report”] 
93  2008 Group of Experts Final Report, para.61., 
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functioning of the KPCS system.  When the Republic of Congo was expelled from the KPCS in 
2004 and readmitted in 2007, KPCS officials did not offer any concrete explanation for these 
decisions.97  As one NGO observes, “[t]he Kimberley Process was seriously flawed from the 
beginning. The Kimberley system of "voluntary self-regulation" on the part of the diamond 
industry has meant a significant lack of transparency and independent monitoring efforts. The 
World Diamond Council, initially established to represent the diamond industry at the Kimberley 
Process, has failed to coordinate effective industry monitoring. Governments, too, have been 
uninterested in monitoring and regulating the diamond trade. Some say the Kimberley Process 
amounted to little more than a public relations stunt for the diamond industry, and recent reports 
by Global Witness and other NGOs have found little evidence of genuine attempts to deliver on 
industry commitments.”98  In contrast, the Group of Experts’ recommendation for State measures 
on due diligence verification, bans, and other forms of quantitative restrictions against armed 
groups’ trade in commodities and minerals appears clearly premised on the international 
obligations of all States under Security Council resolutions in relation to the DRC, as well as the 
applicable international humanitarian law conventions, including the prohibitions against child 
soldiering. 
While there is admittedly no specific set of international regulations controlling armed 
groups’ trade in facially-licit goods, the international responsibilities of States to take preventive 
measures against such trade may be reasonably embraced within the full range of international 
conventions and Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflict.  The Convention 
on the Rights of the Child repeatedly obligates States to take all necessary measures to “protect 
children from the illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances as defined in the 
relevant international treaties, and to prevent the use of children in the illicit production and 
trafficking of such substances”;99 to ensure the implementation of the “right of the child to be 
protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be 
hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health, or 
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physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development”;100 and in accordance with obligations 
under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, to 
“take all feasible measures to ensure the protection and care of children who are affected by an 
armed conflict.”101  Imposing quantitative restrictions in armed groups’ trade in facially-licit 
goods produced through the participation of child soldiers has also not been ruled out in the 
encompassing language of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict, which provides, among others, that State Parties 
“shall take all necessary legal, administrative and other measures to ensure the effective 
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the present Protocol within its 
jurisdiction”;102 and “shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, 
including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices.”103  
Taking these child-specific international obligations together with the Security Council’s 
repeated resolutions obligating States to bring an end to impunity for those responsible for child 
soldiering, to implement “special measures” protect children in armed conflict, and to take 
measures against State and non-State actors that engage in illicit trade in natural resources and 
small arms --- 104 attests to the necessary corollary that States also possess international 
responsibility to restrict the flow of armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods produced with the 
participation of child soldiers. 
 
 
C. Synthesis: International frameworks on the control of financing of armed groups 
through cross-border trade 
As shown in the previous subsections, the descriptive summaries of the relative 
international regulatory regimes applicable to armed groups highlight several important 
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distinctions in the institutional enforcement of international prohibitions against child soldiering.  
First, armed groups’ trade in illicit goods or prohibited substances such as drugs and small arms 
is more easily distinguishable from other types of goods.  Whether these goods or substances 
were produced or distributed with child soldier intervention (as is more likely the case, for 
example, in Burma, Colombia, Brazil, or the DRC), States can ultimately prevent armed groups 
from profiting from the labour of child soldiers in these goods through the per se ban on the 
entry and subsequent sale of such goods into their respective territories. This is not necessarily 
the case with facially-licit goods such as minerals, natural resources, and other commodities, 
where States inimitably have to determine for themselves the origins or provenance of such 
goods.  If such goods are indeed attributable to child soldier-labour for armed groups, States 
must thereafter decide if they can lawfully impose quantitative restrictions against their entry, 
absent specific domestic laws or customs regulations providing this effect within their respective 
jurisdictions.  (As I argue in Part II, States not only have the capability to do this without 
infringing multilateral trading rules, but they have the positive obligation to effectuate such 
quantitative restrictions under the current architecture of international prohibitions against child 
soldiering.) 
Second, the highly centralized internationalized framework of cooperation of States on 
prohibited substances appears more conducive for States to obtain timely and updated 
information on armed groups’ trafficking of prohibited substances. This level of information 
exchange makes it easier for States to remain alert to the possible flow of such substances across 
or into their respective jurisdictions. This is not the case with respect to armed groups’ trading 
activities in relation to facially-licit goods, where there is no such institutionalized cooperation or 
information exchange among States with respect to such activities.  The discovery of the “blood 
diamond” trade as a source of armed groups’ financing, itself came midstream into armed 
conflicts, sometimes decades after these conflicts began as in the case of Sierra Leone, Angola, 
and the DRC:  “[t]he interchangeable terms ‘conflict diamonds’ and ‘blood diamonds’ were 
originally used in connection with the civil war in Angola.  The link between the exploitation of 
diamond resources and extensive human rights abuses was brought to international attention by a 
UN Security Council Expert Panel dealing with Angola.  Nevertheless, the term ‘blood 
diamonds’ did not appear in any official UN document; instead it was a media creation that 
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successfully and succinctly communicated the horror of the conflict.”105  While the United 
Nations has facilitated dialogue and investigations in the past decade on the linkages between the 
exploitation of natural resources and armed conflicts, there is no definitive database to date that 
authoritatively identifies and associates armed groups with various types of traded facially-licit 
goods.  The length of years intervening between the release of the reports of the UN Group of 
Experts on armed groups’ exploitation of natural resources also creates bureaucratic and 
logistical obstacles for States bent on stopping the flow of trade in their respective jurisdictions. 
Finally, the absence of specific international rules on jurisdiction, subject-matter, and 
settlement of disputes in relation to restrictions on the flow of armed groups’ trade in facially-
licit goods can dampen States’ rigour and initiative in policing the flow of such goods within 
their borders.  Unlike trafficking in prohibited substances, which is tightly regulated in an 
international, scheduling, policing and monitoring system administered by the International 
Narcotics Board, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations, in cooperation with States, there is no equivalent “red flag” system for trade in 
minerals and commodities.  States are left to their own information and discretion in determining 
whether or not to impose quantitative restrictions on minerals and commodities.  Often as not, 
States are loathe to resort to such restrictions for fear of being accused of violating multilateral 
trading rules and obligations in the GATT, and provoking retaliatory measures from fellow 
States affected by the restrictions.   
As a consequence of the asymmetry in international regulations on the flow of armed 
groups’ trade in prohibited substances and facially-licit goods, it should not be surprising that 
armed groups continue to thrive even when forced to cut back on the more high-risk trade in 
prohibited substances.  Armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods such as minerals and 
commodities can be innocuously done with the complicity of fronting corporations or individuals 
that ‘legitimize’ trade on their behalf with international counterpart entities.  The magnitude of 
such trade barely registers in official government economic statistics, unless the trade could be 
linked to the suspicious involvement of high-ranking public figures.  This is precisely what 
unravelled in the case of Charles Taylor, a former president of Liberia standing trial before the 
                                                            
105  Iryna Marchuk, Confonting Blood Diamonds in Sierra Leone:  The Trial of Charles Taylor, 4 Yale J. Int’l 
Affairs 2 (Spring-Summer 2009), 87-99, at 88. 
30 
 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.  An NGO called Partnership Africa Canada first released its 
report in January 2000 on the financing of armed conflict in Sierra Leone through Taylor’s 
diamond smuggling activities into neighboring Liberia.  Two months thereafter, or on March 
2000, the Angola Sanctions Committee presented the UN Security Council with its Final Report 
(the “Fowler Report”) which drew similar conclusions, and also identified heads of state, such as 
the presidents of Togo and Burkina Faso, as violators of the UN sanctions regime.106  Taylor was 
reported to have backed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) by providing assistance, 
supplying arms and ammunition in exchange for diamonds, and enlisting masses of child soldiers 
to participate in the hostilities as well as to furnish labour for diamond mining and quarrying.107   
To date, more and more reports are surfacing on the financing of armed conflicts through 
trade in facially-licit goods, such as the cocoa trade in Côte d’Ivoire,108 and the global timber 
trade from conflict zones in Africa and Asia.109 It is highly likely that armed groups engaged in 
protracted conflicts will take advantage of the current regulatory gaps, and shift more of their 
financing operations towards trade in facially-licit goods and commodities.  In 2002, and well 
before the KPCS came into being, a British NGO, Global Witness, proposed a general 
framework for tracking the trade in goods and commodities that finance armed conflict.  Among 
their recommendations, Global Witness stressed the need for harmonisation of reporting 
requirements, labelling procedures, audited chain of custody arrangements, international 
cooperation on information exchanges, transparency and accountability among participating 
States, and an internationalized structure for monitoring the flow of such goods.110  Notably, the 
proposal clarifies that eventual tracking mechanisms must be WTO-compliant, and harmonized 
with existing international law.  
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International conflict policy experts remain optimistic that “[t]argeting the finances of 
combatants may be a cost-effective means of influencing the behaviour of recalcitrant factions in 
civil conflicts.  The required technology and expertise are already highly developed in the 
context of drug traffickers and terrorists and could be applied to belligerents.”111 As I show in 
Part II, States need not wait for the international community to reach a definitive consensus on 
how to fill in regulatory gaps with respect to armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods.  Even 
without more specialized international treaty instruments, States can act within their respective 
competencies to vindicate their shared international responsibilities to prevent child soldiering.  
As recent literature suggests, it is possible to track the movement of armed groups’ trade in 
facially-licit goods using States’ own customs powers.  Applying the UN Group of Experts’ 
recommendation, States can also, of their own volition, require companies operating within their 
respective jurisdictions to conduct due diligence and certify to domestic regulatory authorities 
that facially-licit goods and commodities were not sourced from armed groups or their affiliated 
fronting companies as reported by the UN Group of Experts.  Finally, where States have 
reasonable basis to conclude that facially-licit goods produced and/or distributed through child 
soldier participation have been traded by armed groups, they are well-within their authority and 
international responsibility to ban such trade.  Part II will show that none of these domestic 
measures violate specific multilateral trading rules against non-discrimination, prohibition 
against discriminatory and arbitrary quantitative restrictions, and the most-favoured nation 
clause, since States could avail of the exceptions clauses under GATT Articles XX and XXI. 
 
 
II. PROPOSAL:  WTO-COMPLIANT STATE REGULATORY MEASURES AGAINST THE FLOW 
OF CHILD SOLDIER-PRODUCED OR DISTRIBUTED GOODS 
Treaties and instruments that provide for tracking, monitoring, and institutional 
enforcement mechanisms applicable to specific substances, goods, or items predominate in 
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international environmental law, most especially on issues of endangered species,112 genetically-
modified organisms,113 hazardous wastes114 and chemicals,115 and ozone-depleting substances.116  
There is no counterpart binding international regulatory framework in place for tracking and 
monitoring armed groups’ cross-border trade in facially-licit goods and commodities.  Even the 
European Union, which pioneered fair trade labelling and eco-labelling, has not yet 
institutionalized policy instruments to address this form of trade.117  Current proposals to address 
this form of trade largely focus on the administrative regulation of corporations and other entities 
that are implicated in armed groups’ trading activities:  1) initiatives that seek to increase 
payments and financial transparency from natural resource corporations and governments in 
conflict zones; 2) heightened institutional oversight over financial aid extended by international 
development agencies; 3) direct distribution of revenue resources to citizens, bypassing 
government intermediation; 4) strengthening citizen participation in public administrative 
agencies that exercise oversight over natural resource corporations; and 5) general reforms of 
corporate practices, as seen in the Global Compact’s Ten Principles, the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Statement of 
Principles and Agreed Actions, and the UN Subcommission on Human Rights’ draft Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights.118  As of this writing, current international initiatives remain at nascent stages, 
with the previously-discussed non-binding certification process in the KPCS system for conflict 
diamonds, and the ongoing drafting process for a UN Small Arms Treaty, which regained 
momentum after the United States reversed its position and declared support for the treaty in 
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2009.119  UN experts have advocated an international agreement on small arms and light 
weapons to reduce, if not eliminate, the global incidence of child soldiering.120  These measures 
are more general in scope and applicability to States, in contrast to the UN Security Council’s 
conflict or region-specific measures.121 
All of these initiatives contribute, regardless of degree, to the creation of economic 
disincentives to armed groups that enlist child soldiers.  It would be equally desirable for the 
international community to reach agreement that enhances cooperation, monitoring, and 
enforcement on armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods and commodities, similar to the 
tightly synchronized normative and institutional network on international drug trafficking.  
Pending such an agreement, however, I submit that States have the capability to impose a range 
of domestic measures designed to prevent and deter facilitating armed groups’ trade in such child 
soldier-produced and/or distributed goods and commodities, and are justified in doing so under 
international economic law.  The next subsection outlines possible features of such domestic 
measures, followed by a subsection discussing how these measures comply with multilateral 
trading rules. 
 
A.  Possible domestic measures against armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods 
                                                            
119  Bill Varner, “US Backs Arms Trade Treaty at the UN, Abandoning Bush Opposition”, Bloomberg, 30 
October 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=abkyS4.975YM 
(last visited 10 January 2010). 
120  Suzanne Hoeksema, “Arms Treaty Could Be Powerful Tool to Protect Children”, IPS, 23 October 2009, 
available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48970 (last visited 10 January 2010).   
121  See UN SC resolution 1643, S/RES/1643 (2005), which threatened sanctions against individuals violating 
the arms embargo or the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire.  The resolution broadened the embargo to include 
diamond exports.;UN SC resolution 1343, S/RES/1343 (2001), which imposed sanctions on Monrovia for 
aiding the RUF in Sierra Leone; UN SC resolution 1306, S/RES/1306 (2000), which banned diamond 
trading in Sierra Leone.  See also 2005 Report of the Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, 7 November 2005, 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/1107panel.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010); 2002 
Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, 19 April 2002, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/Liberia2/470e.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010); 2001 Report of 
the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia, 26 October 2001, available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/Liberia2/1015e.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010); 2001 Addendum 
to the Report of the Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other forms of wealth in 
Liberia, 13 November 2001, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/S.2001.1072.En?Opendocument (last visited 10 
January 2010); 2001 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12 April 2001, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/S.2001.357.En?Opendocument (last visited 10 
January 2010).   
34 
 
Policy analysts have offered numerous recommendations that States can adopt to track 
the flow of armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods and commodities.  Jonathan Winer 
proposes a customs-based regime, using Unique Consignment Reference (UCR) and Container 
Security Initiative (CSI), which are consistent with customs practices of several States 
throughout the world.122  Developed in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the World 
Customs Organization (WCO) administers UCRs for many customs jurisdictions throughout the 
world:123  “A UCR number is the equivalent of a bar code applied as early as possible to track all 
international movements of goods for which customs control is required and then used as an 
access key for audit, consignment tracking, and information reconciliation.  By requiring every 
good moving in international trade to have a unique number attached to it, the UCR system 
would create a mechanism to monitor and track the identity and movement of goods by region, 
by country, by type of good, by seller, by buyer, by shipper, or by any other broadly useful 
characteristic.”124 On the other hand, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) is the brainchild of 
the United States government, a system designed to enhance the security of sea cargo containers 
with pre-screening high-risk containers, and employing advanced detection technology to 
uncover hidden contraband.  CSI-compliance standards have already been successfully adopted 
in at least 44 of the world’s largest seaports,125 while UCRs have already been tested and 
successfully deployed in several jurisdictions.126  Winer observes that UCR “could potentially be 
applied to goods moving across national borders not only in containers and barrels but in 
briefcases and envelopes:  all that is required is the international political will to mandate the use 
of UCR numbers for all commercial shipments of all types of goods across borders.  When the 
activities of particular firms have been found to be suspect, their use of the UCR system would 
be prohibited, and any effort at further evasion would necessarily involve falsification of UCR 
                                                            
122  Jonathan Winer, Tracking Conflict Commodities and Financing, pp. 69-93, at 83 et seq. in BALLENTINE & 
NITZSCHKE. 
123  See “WCO Unique Consignment Reference (UCR)”, available at 
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Procedures%20and%20Facilitatio
n/UCR_new_e.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010). 
124  Winer, at 84. 
125  See Nicolas Hughes Allen, The Container Security Initiative:  Costs, Implications, and Relevance to 
Developing Countries, 26 Public Administration and Development 5, at pp. 439-447 (21 November 2006). 
126  Juha Hintsa and Dietmar Jost, Impact Analysis of Two World Custom Organization Technical Instruments – 
Customs Data Model and Unique Consignment Reference – On Customs Operations and Performance: 
Survey at 18 Customs Administrations, pp. 134-137 in ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, EGOV 2004, ZARAGOZA, SPAIN, AUGUST 30-SEPTEMBER 3, 2004 
(Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2004). 
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documentation.  Once a customs agency detects improper UCR documentation, other UCR 
documentation with the same characteristics could then be traced and matched to containers, and 
the ports participating in the CSI could treat this information as a red flag to apply to any 
containers relating to the persons, entities, or goods covered by the suspect UCR 
documentation.”127 
Patricia Feeney and Tom Kenny theorize the possible application of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises128 to corporate conduct in conflict zones.129  These 
Guidelines “apply not only to companies operating in adhering countries but also to companies 
based in adhering countries operating in any other country.  In this way, their scope includes 
company operations in nonadhering countries, where most of today’s conflicts take place.”130  
While the Guidelines comprise a set of recommendations OECD governments have agreed upon 
in encouraging corporate conduct, there is nothing barring individual States from formally 
legislating its key measures to make them legally binding within their respective jurisdictions.  
Conflict-relevant provisions in the OECD Guidelines that could be useful to stopping the flow of 
armed groups’ trade in facially-licit goods and commodities include its Chapter VI provisions on 
combating bribery, establishing proper auditing and accountability practices; Chapter III 
provisions on disclosure regarding enterprises’ activities, structure, financial situation and 
performance; Chapter IV provisions on contributing to the effective abolition of child labour; 
Chapter V provisions on environmental activities; and most importantly, the Chapter II provision 
on “respect[ing] the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host 
government’s international obligations and commitments”.  
Finally, combining the UN Group of Experts’ 2008 recommendation with some features 
of the certification system in KPCS, States can themselves design measures purposefully 
requiring exporters and consumers of commodities to certify that they have conducted due 
diligence on their respective supply chains, and have ensured, to the best of their knowledge that 
none of their known suppliers of primary or intermediate goods or commodities are linked, 
                                                            
127  Winer, at 85. 
128  OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD 2008, available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf  (last visited 20 January 2010). 
129  Patricia Feeney and Tom Kenny, Conflict Management and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, at pp 345-375 in BALLENTINE & NITZSCHKE. 
130  Feeney and Kenny, at 347. 
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affiliated, or otherwise used to finance armed groups’ trade in child soldier-produced or 
distributed goods.  Such a certification system, even if localized for now to particular States that 
undertake to adopt it, could eventually be developed towards a common international customs 
database on exporters, consumers, goods, and supply chains.  Where such certifications cannot 
be produced, a State could prohibit the entry of such non-certified goods into its territory for a 
certain period while the source and transmission channels used for the goods in question are 
investigated.  
To date, modern certification systems in some countries such as the United States and EU 
countries have incrementally expanded beyond conflict diamonds to gemstones, minerals, and 
other natural resources such as timber.131  Considering the presence of various regional and 
bilateral customs cooperation agreements today that tackle related issues of fraud, money 
laundering, the flow of illegal goods and contraband, it is not too remote to envisage a situation 
in the future where States internally imposing domestic measures to stop the flow of armed 
groups’ trade in child-soldier produced and/or distributed goods and commodities, could build on 
regulatory experiences and possibly extend cooperation in these matters as part of the scope of 
their international customs agreements with fellow States. 
Regardless of the qualitative contours of the domestic measure that a State might impose 
in relation to armed groups’ trade in child soldier-produced and/or distributed facially-licit goods 
and commodities, the State will inevitably have to ensure that this trade restriction does not 
violate multilateral trading rules.  The next section discusses a State’s possible justifications, 
under the Exceptions Clauses of GATT Articles XX and XXI, for unilaterally imposing trade 
restrictions against child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods and commodities. 
 
                                                            
131  See Richard A. Schroeder, Tanzanite as a conflict gem: Certifying a secure commodity chain in Tanzania, 




rlVersion=0&_userid=483702&md5=272b0d23c69f869eae54c0ff124bb84b#secx5 (last visited 20 January 
2010); Philippe Le Billon, Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer, 38 
Antipode 4 (2006), at pp. 778-801; Steven Price, Deanna Donovan, and Wil Jong, Confronting Conflict 
Timber, 117-132 in EXTREME CONFLICT AND TROPICAL FORESTS (Springer Netherlands, 2007). 
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B.  State restrictions on child soldier-produced and/or distributed trade and WTO 
compliance through the GATT Exceptions Clauses 
States imposing trade restrictions on the flow of goods and commodities can anticipate 
challenges based on the following core norms of GATT law:   
1) Article XI:1, which is the cornerstone prohibition against quantitative restrictions 
(“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether 
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall 
be instituted or maintained by any [Member] on the importation of any product of 
the territory of any other [Member] or on the exportation or sale for export of any 
product destined for the territory of any other [Member].”); 
 
2) Article XIII:1, which further qualifies that quantitative restrictions should be non-
discriminatorily administered (“No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by 
any [Member] on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
[Member] or on the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any 
other [Member], unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or 
the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or 
restricted.”);  
 
3) Article X:3(a), which prohibits the arbitrary application of trade measures (“Each 
[Member] shall administer in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner all its 
laws, regulations, decisions, and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of 
this Article.”); 
 
4) Article VIII:1(c) (“The [Members]....recognize the need for minimizing the 
incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and 
simplifying import and export documentation requirements.”) and Article VIII:3 
(“No [Member] shall impose substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs 
regulations or procedural requirements.  In particular, no penalty in respect of 
any omission or mistake in customs documentation which is easily rectifiable and 
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obviously made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence shall be greater than 
necessary to serve merely as a warning.”), which, when read together, stresses the 
need for uniform and proportional rules on customs formalities and procedures; 
and most importantly, 
 
 
5) the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses of Article I:1 (“With respect to customs 
duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or 
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or 
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and 
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any [Member] 
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for 
the territories of all other [Members].”) in relation to internal quantitative 
regulations in Article III:7 (“No internal quantitative regulation relating to the 
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions shall be 
applied in such a manner as to allocate any such amount or proportion among 
external sources of supply.”) 
 
Absent specific details on a State’s chosen design for quantitative restrictions for child 
soldier-produced and/or distributed goods, it is impossible to determine a priori how a given 
restriction would comply with the foregoing norms.  While there is, to date, no jurisprudence 
applicable to these provisions of GATT law on child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods, 
States should also be mindful of some WTO decisions on quantitative restrictions that might 
affect how they ultimately design quantitative measures or restriction on child soldier-produced 
and/or distributed goods.  Some examples might suffice here. In devising customs regulations 
dependent on certification, States should consider US – Shrimp,132 where a WTO Panel held that 
the United States violated Article XI:1 when it required all shipments of shrimp and shrimp 
                                                            
132  See Panel Report, US-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, 15 May 
1998, at paras. 7.24-7.62. [hereafter, “US-Shrimp”] 
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products to be accompanied by a declaration or certification “attesting that the shrimp or shrimp 
product in question has been harvested ‘either under conditions that do not adversely affect sea 
turtles...or in waters subject to the jurisdiction of a nation currently certified pursuant to section 
609.”133  The Panel found that, notwithstanding the United States’ admission of its violation of 
Article XI:1, a textual examination of the challenged certification measure revealed the same to 
be a “prohibition or restriction” under Article XI:1.  (Upon resolving this issue, the Panel no 
longer addressed other challenges based on Articles I:1 and XIII:1.)  For States considering 
import licensing measures, they should also note how a non-automatic import licensing system 
(implemented to protect a balance of payments situation) was deemed a prohibited import 
restriction under Art. XI:1 in India-Quantitative Restrictions.134 States that permit private parties 
or trade associations to participate in the enforcement of customs regulations for child soldier 
produced and/or distributed goods and commodities should also examine Argentina – Hides and 
Leather.135 In this case, the Panel held that Argentina administered its regulation (providing for 
the participation of representatives of a domestic tanners’ association in customs inspection 
procedures) in a process that “inherently contains the possibility of revealing confidential 
business information...[as] an unreasonable manner of administering the laws, regulations and 
rules identified in Article X:1 and therefore inconsistent with Article X:3(a).”   
The ideal design features for a State-imposed domestic measure against child soldier-
produced and/or distributed goods, consistent with the latest interpretations of WTO panels on 
specific GATT principles on quantitative restrictions, could be the subject of an entirely separate 
study elsewhere.  For the limited purposes of this paper, I will narrow the issue to whether or not 
a general domestic measure against child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods could be 
justified within the Exceptions clauses of Articles XX and XXI.  I propose that Articles XX(a), 
XX(d), and XXI(b) might furnish legal bases for a State’s imposition of a domestic measure 
curtailing the flow of armed groups’ trade in child soldier-produced and/or distributed facially-
licit goods and commodities.  As there is, to date, no comparable jurisprudence on armed groups’ 
trade in child soldier-produced and/or distributed facially-licit goods and commodities, these 
                                                            
133  Panel Report, US-Shrimp, WT/DS58/R, 15 May 1998, at paras. 7.5-7.6, and 7.11-7.17. 
134  Panel Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile, and Industrial Products, 
WT/DS90/R, 22 September 1999, para. 5.130. 
135  Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished 
Leather, WT/DS155/R, 19 December 2000, at para. 11.94. 
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interpretive arguments might have persuasive value for States considering quantitative 
restrictions on the trade of such goods and commodities.  The following subsections separately 
sketch interpretive theories under the General Exceptions provision of Article XX from the 
Security Exceptions provision of Article XXI. 
1. General exceptions:  Article XX(a) and XX(d) 
WTO jurisprudence has developed a two-tiered test for interpreting GATT Article XX, 
otherwise known as the General Exceptions clause.  GATT Article XX contains a general 
chapeau (“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any [Member] of 
measures...”) and ten specifically enumerated exceptions, (a) to (j).  The settled two-tiered 
methodology first requires that a measure be provisionally evaluated or justified according to the 
specific exception.  If the measure is found to be provisionally justified under the specific 
exception, then the next step would be to test the measure’s compliance with the requirements of 
the chapeau.136 
The WTO Appellate Body also prescribes a “balancing test” in interpreting Article XX, 
attributable to the unique language used in Article XX.  In US – Gasoline,137 the Appellate Body 
stressed the purposely differentiated wording employed throughout Article XX:  “In enumerating 
the various categories of governmental acts, laws or regulations which WTO Members may carry 
out or promulgate in pursuit of differing legitimate state policies or interests outside the realm of 
trade liberalization, Article XX uses different terms in respect of different categories: 
"necessary" - in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); "essential" - in paragraph (j); "relating to" - in 
paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); "for the protection of" - in paragraph (f); "in pursuance of" - in 
paragraph (h); and "involving" - in paragraph (i).  It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the 
WTO Members intended to require, in respect ofeach and every category, the same kind or 
degree of connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal and the state interest or 
                                                            
136  Appellate Body Report, US-Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, paras. 118-120. 
137  Appellate Body Report, US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 
April 1996. [hereafter, “US-Gasoline”] 
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policy sought to be promoted or realized.”138  The Appellate Body also refers to the treaty 
context in relation to WTO Members’ affirmative commitments located in the rest of the 
provisions of GATT:  “[t]he relationship between the affirmative commitments set out in, e.g., 
Articles I, III and XI, and the policies and interests embodied in the "General Exceptions" listed 
in Article XX, can be given meaning within the framework of the General Agreement and its 
object and purpose by a treaty interpreter only on a case-to-case basis, by careful scrutiny of the 
factual and legal context in a given dispute, without disregarding the words actually used by the 
WTO Members themselves to express their intent and purpose.”139 
Article XX’s drafting history shows that States were motivated by the desire to meet 
particular conditions existing in specific countries in construing exceptions from multilateral 
trade obligations under the GATT.140  The chapeau is intended to guard against the abusive 
interpretation of any of the itemized exceptions:  “[t]he chapeau is animated by the principle that 
while the exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be 
so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the 
substantive rule of the General Agreement.  If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, 
in other words, the measures falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, 
with due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of 
the other parties concerned.”141  The particular phraseology of the chapeau in Article XX 
“embodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of 
rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of the exceptions 
under Article XX, specified in paragraphs (a) to (j), on the other hand, and the substantive rights 
of the other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand.”142   
With these methodological interpretations in mind, we can provisionally scrutinize a 
State’s quantitative restriction against child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods at its most 
                                                            
138  US-Gasoline, pp. 17-18. 
139  US-Gasoline, p. 18. 
140  RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE (Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at pp. 531-533. 
141  WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 22.  Full text available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/a1s1p1_e.htm (last visited 10 
November 2008). 
142  WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755, at 156. 
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extreme application --- in this case, an outright ban on such goods --- and determine whether it 
can be justified under Article XX.  For purposes of this legal analysis, I assume that the State has 
duly identified the origin or provenance of such goods as attributable to an armed group that 
enlists child soldiers for its operations.  (I reserve discussion in Part III on potential policy 
problems arising from identification and attribution of child soldier-produced and/or distributed 
goods.)  I submit that the measure could be embraced under the “public morals” exception in 
Article XX(a), and also the “customs enforcement” exception in Article XX(d). 
1.1.  The “public morals” exception in Article XX(a) 
Until the August 2009 Panel Report in China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,143 there 
was no available jurisprudence interpreting GATT Article XX(a).  The Appellate Body in Korea-
Various Measures on Beef and EC-Asbestos generally recognized that WTO Members have the 
right to determine the level of protection they consider appropriate insofar as other specific 
exceptions in GATT Article XX were concerned.144  At best, scholars analogized WTO 
jurisprudence interpreting a similarly-worded provision in the General Agreement on Trade and 
Services (GATS) Article XIV(a) (“measures necessary to protect public morals or to maintain 
public order”).  The Panel in US-Gambling interpreted the “public morals” exception as one that 
requires a measure “must be aimed at protecting the interests of the people within a community 
or a nation as a whole”, such that “the term ‘public morals’ denotes standards of right and wrong 
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”145  US-Gambling also laid the 
balancing test for determining the “necessity” of a measure to the objective of protecting public 
morals: 
“The process begins with an assessment of the ‘relative importance’ of the 
interests or values furthered by the challenged measure.  Having ascertained the 
importance of the particular interests at stake, a panel should then turn to the other 
factors that are to be ‘weighed and balanced’.  The Appellate Body has pointed to 
                                                            
143  Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications 
and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R, 12 August 2009 [hereafter, China-Publications]. 
144  Appellate Body, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 December 2000, at para. 176 [hereafter, “Korea – Beef”]; Appellate Body, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 
March 2001 [hereafter, “EC-Asbestos”], at para. 168. 
145  Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WT/DS285/R, 10 November 2004, at paras. 6.463 and 6.465. 
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two factors that, in most cases, will be relevant to a panel’s determination of the 
‘necessity’ of a measure, although not necessarily exhaustive of factors that might 
be considered.  One factor is the contribution of the measure to the realization of 
the ends pursued by it; the other factor is the restrictive impact of the measure on 
international commerce.” 
In the absence of WTO jurisprudence specifically interpreting GATT Article XX(a) until 
August 2009 in China- Publications, some scholars have argued that this “public morals” 
exception could be used to justify adopting or maintaining a ban on products of child labour, 
such as blood diamonds.146  I submit that even the WTO Panel’s interpretation of Article XX(a) 
in China-Publications would not rule out a ban on child soldier-produced and/or distributed 
goods. 
To recall, in this case China invoked Article XX(a) to justify a set of measures which 
regulated the entry of foreign publications, audiovisuals and other media forms, contending that 
“Chinese regulations governing the importation of cultural goods establish a content review 
mechanism and a system for the selection of import entities directed at protecting public morals 
in China.” China advanced the argument that “cultural goods are unique in that they may have a 
potentially serious impact on societal and individual morals...imported cultural goods, because 
they are vectors of different cultural values, may collide with standards of right and wrong 
conduct.”147  The Panel noted that the United States did not specifically challenge the nature of 
the measures and their linkage to the objective of protecting public morals, but instead 
“[challenged] the means China has chosen to achieve its objective of protecting public morals.  
More particularly, the United States argues that it is not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of 
Article XX(a) for importers to perform content review...[which] is independent of importation 
and can be performed by individuals or entities unrelated to the importation process.”148  The 
                                                            
146  PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS (Cambridge University Press, 2008), at p. 640; Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human 
Rights Law in World Trade Organization Rules, 16 Fla. J. Int’l L. 219 (March 2004), at 223:  “Article 
XX(a) likely in addition would support state action on a number of other human rights concerns,  which might 
prompt a WTO Member to ban trade to protest immoral acts by a foreign government against its citizens, such as 
products made by indentured children or from countries which deny freedom of the press, the right to emigrate, 
or with a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. Each of these reasons has been used by the 
United States to justify trade restrictions.”  See also Sarah Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and 
International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 133 (2002), at 157; Michael Trebilcock 
and Robert Howse, Trade Policy and Labor Standards, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 261 (2005), at 290. 
147  China-Publications, at para. 7.712. 
148  China-Publications, para. 7.756. 
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Panel then proceeded to explicitly adopt the very same definition of “public morals” that was set 
by the Appellate Body in US-Gambling in relation to GATS Article XIV(a).149  Since the United 
States did not specifically deny that the measures had a link to China’s public morals objective, 
the issue became the “necessity” of the measures China chose to advance its public morals 
objective, as to bring them within the purview of Article XX(a). 
The China-Publications Panel adopted the same “necessity” test in US-Gambling, but 
added another factor, “the restriction on the right to import”, to US-Gambling’s two factors (e.g. 
the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it, and second, the 
restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce): 
“We recall that we have agreed to proceed on the assumption that Article 
XX is available as a direct defence for measures that are inconsistent with China’s 
trading rights commitments under the Accession Protocol.  Therefore, and 
consistently with the statement by the Appellate Body in US-Gambling, we think 
that in the case before us, an additional factor should be taken into account.  
Specifically, we think that we should weigh not only the restrictive impact the 
measures at issue have on imports of relevant products, but also the restrictive 
effect they have on those wishing to engage in importing, in particular on their 
right to trade.  In our view, if Article XX is assumed to be a direct defence for 
measures in breach of trading rights commitments, it makes sense to consider how 
much these measures restrict the right to import. This would appear to parallel a 
situation where imposes a WTO-inconsistent ban on imports of products and 
where an article XX defence requires examination of how much the ban restricts 
imports of those same products.” 
The China-Publications Panel added the above factor (e.g. restrictions on the right to 
import) from its reading of China’s argument that the import restrictions were “necessary to 
ensure that the content review can be performed in respect of relevant imported products in a 
                                                            
149  China-Publications, para. 7.759:  “We note that the panel and Appellate Body in US – Gambling examined 
the meaning of the term "public morals" as it is used in Article XIV(a) of the GATS, which is the GATS 
provision corresponding to Article XX(a). The panel in US – Gambling, in an interpretation not questioned 
by the Appellate Body, found that "the term 'public morals' denotes standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation". The panel went on to note that "the content of these 
concepts for Members can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing 
social, cultural, ethical and religious values." The panel went on to note that Members, in applying this and 
other similar societal concepts, "should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the 
concepts of 'public morals' ... in their respective territories, according to their own systems and scales of 
values." Since Article XX(a) uses the same concept as Article XIV(a), and since we see no reason to depart 
from the interpretation of "public morals" developed by the panel in US – Gambling, we adopt the same 
interpretation for purposes of our Article XX(a) analysis.” 
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manner which achieves the high level of protection China seeks to achieve.”150  After weighing 
all three factors against the particular design of each measure, and further inquiring if there were 
any other reasonably-available measures to China, the Panel concluded that “none of the 
provisions of China’s measures which we have determined to be inconsistent with China’s 
trading rights commitments under the Accession Protocol is ‘necessary’ within the meaning of 
Art. XX(a).  In respect of these provisions, China has either not made a prima facie case that they 
are ‘necessary’, or China has not demonstrated that an alternative put forward by the United 
States is not a genuine alternative or is not reasonably available to China, in the light of the 
interest being pursued and China’s desired level of protection.”151 
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential developments to the interpretation of Article 
XX(a), a State’s ban on child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods could meet both the 
“public morals” definition and the balancing test for “necessity”.  As previously discussed, the 
international prohibitions against child soldiering extend to all “necessary” measures that prevent 
the use of children in this “worst form of child labour”.152  A State-imposed ban on child soldier-
produced and/or distributed goods can be readily subsumed within the “public morals” definition 
for GATT Article XX(a), as the enforcement of international prohibitions against child 
soldiering directly implicate “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained on behalf of a 
community or nation.”  The fact that the majority of States throughout the world have obligated 
themselves to prohibit and outlaw child soldiering through numerous international treaty 
instruments, sufficiently demonstrates how they have agreed to characterize standards of conduct 
in relation to child soldiering. 
Likewise, a State-imposed ban of child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods could 
meet the three previously-described aspects of the balancing test for the “necessity” of a 
measure.  A ban “contributes to the realization of the ends”, or the objective of enforcing both 
international prohibitions against child soldiering and international responsibilities to prevent 
child soldiering under current treaty instruments such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child involving children and armed conflict.  By denying such goods access 
to the flow of trade, States ensure that armed groups do not profit from the exploitation of child 
                                                            
150  China-Publications, para.7.791. 
151  China-Publications, para. 7.911. 
152  See  pp. 2-4 of this article. 
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soldiers for all activities and operations that sustain their participation in armed conflict.  When a 
State can properly identify the origin of such child soldier- produced and/or distributed goods 
from legitimately traded goods (such as, for example, by adopting the UCR and CSI mechanisms 
in customs enforcement), a ban would certainly have a “restrictive impact on international 
commerce.”153  Finally, it cannot be said that a ban causes unreasonable “restrictions on the right 
to import”, since child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods, by nature, fall outside the 
scope of permitted imports due to States’ obligations to enforce international prohibitions against 
child soldiering.  This is an entirely different situation from the qualitative restrictions in 
publications and audiovisual goods subject of the China-Publications case, which did not 
involve goods for which there were comparable international restrictions or prohibitions.  On its 
face, therefore, and without probing a State’s particular system design for a ban on child soldier-
produced and/or distributed goods, GATT Article XX(a) could justify a State-imposed ban. 
1.2.  The “customs enforcement” exception in Article XX(d) 
The Appellate Body also laid out a two-tiered test for applying Article XX(d) in Korea-
Various Measures on Beef:154   “[f]irst, the measure must be one designed to ‘secure compliance’ 
with laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 
1994.  Second, the measure must be ‘necessary’ to secure such compliance.  A Member who 
invokes Article XX(d) as a justification has the burden of demonstrating that these two 
requirements are met.”  A State-imposed ban on child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods 
could also meet both aspects of the interpretive test for Article XX(d). 
First, a ban secures compliance with international prohibitions against child soldiering, as 
well as treaty-defined preventive duties under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child involving children and armed conflict and ILO Convention No. 182.155 A 
bare textual examination of these prohibitions and duties shows that none of them are facially 
inconsistent with GATT 1994. Accordingly, if these international prohibitions and duties form 
part of the domestic law of a WTO Member by direct effect or legislative transformation, they 
                                                            
153  I discuss the potential policy problems in relation to identification and attribution in Part III, and show 
why the WTO dispute settlement framework is the better venue for resolving controversies on 
identification and attribution. 
154  Korea-Beef, at para. 157. 
155  Art. 4, Optional Protocol; Arts. 6 and 7, ILO Convention No. 182. 
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could be subsumed within the scope of “laws and regulations” in Article XX(d).  In Mexico-
Taxes on Soft Drinks,156 the Appellate Body carefully delineated that international agreements 
ipso facto do not fall within “laws and regulations” in Article XX(d), unless the rules within such 
agreements are found within the domestic legal system of a WTO Member.  Matters relating to 
“customs enforcement” would “generally involve rights and obligations that apply to importers 
or exporters”.157  Where a State has incorporated the international prohibitions or preventive 
duties in relation to child soldiering as part of domestic law, therefore, it can rightfully invoke a 
State ban on child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods as part of “customs enforcement” or 
“laws and regulations” within the meaning of Article XX(d).  A ban would “secure compliance” 
as understood in Article XX(d), because it “enforces compliance”158 with such domestically-
incorporated norms on child soldiering. 
Second, a ban is clearly “necessary” to secure compliance with “laws and regulations” or 
“customs enforcement” matters in relation to child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods.  
The Panel Report in US-Section 337 adopted a similar balancing test for “necessity” as had been 
set by the Appellate Body in US-Gambling: 
“5.26.  It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a 
measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as ‘necessary’ in terms of 
Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to 
employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to 
it.  By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT 
provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among 
the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with other GATT provisions. The Panel wished to make it clear that 
this does not mean that a contracting party could be asked to change its 
substantive patent law or its desired level of enforcement of that law, provided 
that such law and such level of enforcement are the same for imported and 
domestically-produced products.  However, it does mean that, if a contracting 
party could reasonably secure that level of enforcement in a manner that is not 
inconsistent with other GATT provisions, it would be required to do so.”159 
                                                            
156  Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, 6 
March 2006, at paras. 68-71. [hereafter, “Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks”] 
157  Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 70. 
158  Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 73. 
159  Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439-36S/345, 7 November 1989, at 
para. 5.26.  Italics supplied. 
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Arguably, a ban is a reasonably available measure to a State to enforce its laws, 
regulations, and customs enforcement rules in relation to child soldier-produced and/or 
distributed goods.  Assuming that a State has been able to determine the provenance of goods to 
armed groups’ trade in child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods, the ban is least 
inconsistent with GATT provisions because GATT norms (such as the substantive prohibitions 
against qualitative restrictions and the principles of non-discrimination and MFN) pertain to 
legitimately-traded goods in the international stream of commerce.  Child soldier-produced 
and/or distributed goods, even if facially licit (as in the case of commodities like minerals, 
natural resources, and agricultural crops), could never be treated as legitimate subjects of 
international commerce.  Taking the plethora of international treaty prohibitions against child 
soldiering and international duties to prevent child soldiering, alongside Security Council 
resolutions that mandate States to take measures against the illicit trade and exploitation of 
natural resources,160 a State-imposed ban on child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods 
squarely meets the threshold necessity test as a “reasonably available measure” that is “least 
inconsistent with GATT 1994.” 
1.3.   The chapeau of GATT Article XX 
As the previous analyses have shown, a State-imposed ban on child soldier-produced 
and/or distributed goods meets the first tier for applying GATT Article XX laid down in US-
Gasoline, since the measure could be “provisionally justified under specific exceptions”, as in 
Articles XX(a) and XX(d).  The second tier for applying GATT Article XX requires that a 
measure comply with the requirements of the chapeau to GATT Article XX (“the requirement 
that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.”)  In essence, the chapeau provides a good faith standard that 
aids in assessing the application of a measure invoked under one of the specific exceptions in 
GATT Article XX, and thereby prevent a State from abusing its right to invoke these 
exceptions:161 “[t]he focus of the chapeau, by its express terms, is on the application of a measure 
                                                            
160  See note 104. 
161  See Appellate Body, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 




already found to be inconsistent with an obligation of the GATT 1994 but falling within one of 
the paragraphs of Article XX.  The chapeau’s requirements are two-fold.  First, a measure 
provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs of Article XX must not be applied in a 
manner that would constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ between countries where 
the same conditions prevail.  Secondly, this measure must not be applied in a manner that would 
constitute ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’.  Through these requirements, the 
chapeau serves to ensure that Members’ rights to avail themselves of exceptions are exercised in 
good faith to protect interests considered legitimate under Article XX, not as a means to 
circumvent one Member’s obligations towards others other WTO Members.” 
The foregoing requirements in the chapeau should be built into the regulatory design of a 
State’s ban on child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods.  To ensure that a ban would not 
be deemed a measure that results in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or operates as a 
disguised restriction on international trade, a State have a system that enables it to make reliable 
factual verifications on the source of such goods.  As a matter of fairness, it must also enable 
private parties to contest such factual conclusions on the source of such goods under pre-
established procedures that guarantee transparency, notice, and hearing.  These regulatory 
considerations are not novel departures from existing customs practices throughout the world on 
determining non-preferential rules of origin in relation to quantitative restrictions and origin 
labeling.162  So long as a State can show that it has impartially undertaken its customs 
investigation to determine the origin of such goods, there should be little difficulty complying 
with the good faith requirements of the chapeau in GATT Article XX. 
2. Security Exception:  Article XXI(b)(ii) 
Unlike GATT Article XX, the Security Exceptions under GATT Article XXI do not 
contain a chapeau.  While the wording of GATT Article XXI(b)(ii) (“Nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed...to prevent any [Member] from taking any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests...relating to the traffic in arms, 
ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried 
on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment.”) appears to 
                                                            
162  For a useful comparative examination of rules of origin across jurisdictions, see EDWIN VERMULST, PAUL 
WAER, AND JACQUES BOURGEOIS, RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
(University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
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afford some latitude towards a State’s discretionary determination of its essential security 
interests, it also does not appear to preclude the possibility of judicial review under the WTO 
dispute settlement system.163  An author observes that GATT Article XXI “is rarely relied upon.  
When it has been, it has usually been in cases of serious disruptions in international relations.  In 
such serious cases Article XXI appears available to justify trade measures designed to protect 
human rights.  The limited discipline imposed by Article XXI enhances its potential human 
rights application.”164  However, this interpretation can be contested, since the few instances 
where States invoked GATT Article XXI never reached an adjudicated conclusion.165 
In the absence of jurisprudential guidance on the scope of GATT Article XX(b)(ii), I 
submit that a textual interpretation of this provision, according to its ordinary meaning, could 
accommodate a State-imposed ban of child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods.  GATT 
Article XX(b)(ii) entitles a Member to take action necessary for the protection of its essential 
security in interests “relating to...such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on 
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment.”  As with their trade 
in prohibited substances and goods (such as arms, narcotics and other illegal drugs), armed 
groups’ trade in child soldier-produced and/or distributed facially-licit goods, (such as minerals, 
natural resources, and other commodities) are undertaken to finance their military operations in 
hostilities.  A State could thus be well-justified in barring the entry of such goods that finance the 
prosecution and conduct of armed conflicts.  These justifications should apply with greater force 
where States are internationally obligated to take all necessary measures to prevent the “worst 
forms of child labour”, such as child soldiering and child labour in the illegal and hazardous 
exploitation of natural resources.  A State can reasonably argue that its essential security interests 
reasonably necessitate its exercise of control over such trade flows into the State’s territory, 
                                                            
163  See Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 52 Duke L.J. 
1277 (2003), at 1287-1296. 
164  ANTHONY CASSIMATIS, HUMAN RIGHTS TRADE RELATED MEASURES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
LEGALITY OF TRADE MEASURES IMPOSED IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), at 334. 
165  See Alan S. Alexandroff and Rajeev Sharma, The National Security Provision --- GATT Article XXI, pp. 
1572-1578 in PATRICK F.J. MACRORY, ARTHUR E. APPLETON, AND MICHAEL G. PLUMMER, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (Springer, 2005); PETROS C. 
MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS:  THE GATT AND THE OTHER AGREEMENTS REGULATING TRADE IN GOODS 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), at pp. 322-331. 
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which ultimately redound to the benefit of armed groups engaged in internal or international 
armed conflicts. 
This Part II has shown that there are a variety of quantitatively-restrictive regulatory 
measures that States can unilaterally adopt to prevent the flow of child soldier-produced and/or 
distributed goods into their respective territories.  While international cooperation against this 
form of trade should ideally be undertaken on the same scale as the international regulatory 
framework against prohibited substances, States should not be dissuaded from harnessing 
domestic mechanisms, and exercising their respective customs enforcement powers, to ensure 
that they fulfil their international obligations to prevent child soldiering.  States can use GATT 
Articles XX(a), XX(d), and XXI(b)(ii) to justify these domestic restraints on trade.  
Nevertheless, States might have to consider some policy aspects in designing bans and 
quantitative restrictions against child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods and 
commodities. Part III responds to these aspects alongside the international methods States have 
pursued to vindicate their international responsibility to stop and prevent child soldiering. 
III. PREVENTING CHILD SOLDIERING AS A MATTER OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY: 
INTERNATIONAL METHODS AND DOMESTIC INITIATIVES 
On August 4, 2009, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1882,166 
which reaffirmed previous Council resolutions167 involving the protection of children in armed 
conflict, while emphasizing the primary role of national Governments in providing protection 
and relief to all children affected by armed conflicts.  Resolution 1882 summarizes current 
international methods to stop child soldiering:  1) public condemnation (or “naming and 
shaming”);168 2) fact-finding, reporting, monitoring, and information exchange;169 3) 
incorporating child protection concerns in UN peacekeeping missions;170 4) post-conflict 
demobilization of child soldiers and facilitating their transition and reintegration into their 
                                                            
166  Security Council resolution 1882, S/RES/1882(2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/SC-RESOLUTION1882-2009.pdf  (last visited 10 January 
2010). 
167  Security Council resolutions 1261(25 August 1999), 1314 (11 August 2000), 1379 (20 November 2001), 
1460 (30 January 2003), 1539 (22 April 2004), 1612 (26 July 2005) and Statements of the President of the 
UN Security Council on 24 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/33), 28 November 2006 (S/PRST/2006/48), 12 
February 2008 (S/PRST/2008/6), 17 July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/28), and 29 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/9). 
168  Id. at para. 1. 
169  Id. at paras. 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 17, 19 
170  Id. at paras. 11-12. 
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respective civil communities;171 5) criminal prosecution of individuals that commit the 
international crime of child soldier enlistment;172 and 6) calling for implementation of individual 
States’ time-bound action plans to halt the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict 
situations.173  Resolution 1882 shows that international efforts to stop child soldiering are 
marshalled under a complex web of international legal prohibitions and formal treaty 
instruments; the case-to-case involvement of the UN Security Council in particular situations of 
armed conflict; and an array of fact-finding and monitoring functions simultaneously discharged 
by UN agencies such as the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict.  Apart from these latter agencies, there are also numerous 
international NGOs that comprise a robust international civil society independently investigating, 
monitoring, and reporting on the incidence and continuing proliferation of child soldiering.  Most 
prominent of these are the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, Global March Against Child Labour, Soldier Child International, among others. 
The Security Council’s directive to all States to submit and report on their time-bound 
anti-child soldiering action plans sends a strong message that the prevention of child soldiering is 
also a matter of State responsibility.  While the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
clearly manifests the international community’s agreement to treat child soldier enlistment as a 
matter for individual criminal responsibility, the child soldier prevention should also be seen 
from the prism of State responsibility in light of the express obligations to this end in both the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Child involving Children and Armed 
Conflict and ILO Convention No. 182.  States’ international responsibility to prevent child 
soldiering puts into question their use of domestic and territorial powers, not just to formally 
prohibit and criminalize child soldier enlistment, but more importantly, to respond to conditions 
that have enabled armed groups --- whether State or non-State --- to exploit and conscript 
children into this worst form of child labour in military hostilities.  If the Security Council’s anti-
impunity terminology in Resolution 1882 is any indication, it is that States have a duty to devise 
their own ex ante strategies to prevent child soldiering from arising in the first place within their 
borders. 
                                                            
171  Id. at paras. 13-15. 
172  Id. at para. 16.  
173  Id. at para. 5. 
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This preventive duty in relation to child soldiering can also be situated within the broader 
consensus of States on an international “responsibility to protect” (R2P).  While R2P doctrine 
has been often critically parsed in relation to one of its aspects on the use of force,174 its less 
controversial terminology in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document175 emphasizes the 
notion of States’ individual and collective responsibilities to prevent war crimes and other 
serious violations of human rights.  If the unanimous endorsement of the UN General Assembly 
of R2P doctrine is any indication, it is reasonable to infer that States have reconceptualised how 
they view their own international obligations towards more encompassing and firm commitments 
to prevent war crimes and other serious violations of human rights within their jurisdiction.  
Within this contemporary global consensus, it is not at all far-fetched to examine States’ 
international obligations to prevent child soldiering as part of the corpus of State responsibility.  
It is on this understanding of State responsibility that I propose States use the norms of 
international economic law available to them, and domestically implement bans or quantitative 
restrictions against child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods, pending institutional modes 
of cooperation similar to the international anti-drug trafficking system.   
Certainly, unilateral bans on child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods will not be 
without its attendant policy complications.  For one, we can anticipate that most States will have 
                                                            
174  See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The Continuing Debate over 
Where Authority Should be Located for the Use of Force, NUPI Report, Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs, 2008, available at http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1969/1/R2P-3-
Wheeler%5b1%5d.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010). 
175  2005 World Outcome Summit Document, at paras. 138-139, available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf (last visited 10 January 2010): 
“ 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including 
their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in 
accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise 
this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the  responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In 
this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, 
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises 
and conflicts break out.” 
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the primary difficulty of identifying and attributing goods as originating from the labour of child 
soldiers serving in armed groups.  If a State cannot show that it has justifiable reasons for 
segregating such goods from the legitimate trade of facially-licit goods and commodities, it will 
expectedly encounter opposition and likely retaliation from other States within the trading 
system.  The State in question will likely be burdened to respond before the WTO, incurring both 
logistical and legal costs in defending its trade-restrictive measure.  In this sense, the entire 
strategy of using international economic legal norms to confront child soldiering is also 
contingent on the State’s possession of information as well as its political will and capacity for 
vigorous customs enforcement.  As I attempted to show in Part II, however, the task of 
identifying and tracking such goods is not altogether Herculean.  There is already a viable roster 
of technologies (such as the UCR and CSI systems) and mechanisms (such as legislation on 
corporate conduct, a certification system, financial auditing, among others) that States can 
consider in designing their customs restrictions against child soldier-produced and/or distributed 
goods.  These technologies and mechanisms are no more invasive or costly than what States 
already implement for anti-terrorism customs inspection and enforcement. 
Moreover, States might have less reason to be apprehensive about information 
asymmetry when they unilaterally ban child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods.  The 
mass of publicly available reports from the UN Security Council, the UN specialized agencies, 
and international NGOs in the past decade, (such as the annual detailed Child Soldiers Global 
Report issued by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, the country reports submitted to 
the UN Security Council, and the UN Group of Experts’ and Secretary-General’s reports on 
children and armed conflict) regularly identify and narrow down States that have reported 
incidences of child soldiering.  States can build their own information databases from these 
regular reports, generating their own domestic indicators for “suspect” imports or exports that 
could be attributable to child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods.  States may also 
consider concluding their own bilateral or regional agreements to guarantee information sharing 
to help track the flow of such goods and commodities across adjacent borders and territories. 
Secondly, States would also have to consider private remedial procedures when they 
design domestic measures banning or restricting the flow of child soldier-produced and/or 
distributed goods.  What optimal administrative procedure will ensure that private parties have 
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recourse and access to due process in challenging a State’s characterization of goods as having 
originated from the labour or participation of child soldiers, without sacrificing the demands of 
expediency in preventing the flow of such goods into a State’s territory?  Could other factual 
indicators such as documentary receipts, company registrations, banking and financial 
information, be used to corroborate or bolster a State’s factual determination that such goods are 
illicitly traded by private parties acting as intermediaries for armed groups?  While I have laid 
emphasis in Part II on customs mechanisms and procedures that might be used to track conflict 
goods and commodities, we should also not lose sight of a host of international financial 
regulatory initiatives that enable States to trace proceeds from illicit activities, such as those 
implemented and supervised by the Financial Action Task Force,176 the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the Basel Group of Bank Supervisors, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, the Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors, among 
others.177  All of these initiatives could be considered in complementing a State’s chosen 
administrative procedural design for implementing its ban on child soldier-produced and/or 
distributed goods. 
Finally, a State that proactively uses international economic law norms to implement a 
ban on child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods must also be prepared to deal with both 
its internal constituencies as well as disgruntled States disputing the ban.  An outright ban on 
trade in goods will inevitably impact on domestic producers (who rely on such goods as 
intermediate inputs for their finished goods) or end-consumers.  The State in question must be 
able to convince and persuade disaffected groups at home and abroad that the restrictions on the 
flow of goods are indeed factually and legally justified in light of the State’s international 
responsibility to prevent child soldiering.  This can only be done if the State has a well-designed 
process for information verification and rules of origin for goods.  Otherwise, the costly political 
fallout from selective, arbitrary, or unjustified bans and quantitative restrictions will likely cause 
the State’s decision-makers to abandon the strategy altogether, causing it to relapse into the 
                                                            
176  See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html  (last visited 20 
January 2010). 
177  Winer, at p. 75.  See also Phil Williams and John T. Picarelli, Combating Organized Crime in Armed 
Conflict, pp. 123-152 in BALLENTINE & NITZSCHKE; Cynthia McClintock, The Evolution of Internal War in 
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inertia of awaiting international consensus to stop the flow of child soldier-produced and/or 
distributed goods. 
Conclusion 
Child soldiers will not vanish overnight.  For as long as incentives exist for armed groups 
to enlist children for these worst forms of child labour, no amount of legal formalization of 
prohibitions or rhetorical advocacy can eradicate the phenomenon of child soldiering.  From pre-
modern warfare to postmodern armed conflicts, the inherent advantages of children as logistical, 
support, or direct members of military units have rendered them vulnerable to exploitation to 
serve the ends of military necessity.178  Their attractiveness to armed groups fighting protracted 
insurgencies, armed conflicts, or engaging in terrorist acts, has only increased in recent years 
with the proliferation of small-scale arms and incendiary weapons, and the expansion of armed 
groups’ illicit trade in goods and commodities to finance their operations. 
My proposal of State-imposed unilateral bans on child soldier-produced and/or 
distributed goods aims to address a hitherto-unexplored area of disincentives.  Scholars and 
policy analysts alike have multiple descriptive perspectives on the psychological, economic and 
political root causes of child soldiering,179 and few truly concretize the economic framework that 
undergirds this pernicious practice.  If there is anything that the reportage of “blood diamonds” 
shows us, it is that child soldiers are not mere footmen that increase military advantage in the 
battlefield. They are, in the final analysis, hidden slaves that embolden and empower armed 
groups to sustain hostilities for years. Confronting the phenomenon of child soldiering must 
recognize the compelling force of this reality.  By making States internationally and individually 
responsible for preventing the trade of child soldier-produced and/or distributed goods, it is my 
hope that States will finally decide to leverage the international economic tools available to them 
to concretely realize their international obligations and duties towards the world’s children. 
------------------------o0o------------------------- 
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Press, 2005). 
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